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EDUCATION, ANTIDOMINATION, AND
THE REPUBLICAN GUARANTEE
Kip M. Hustace*

ABSTRACT
This Article offers a new interpretation of the United States Constitution’s
republican guarantee and theorizes its protection of a fundamental right to education.
Courts and education law scholars have identified the republican guarantee as a plausible source of educational rights but have not detailed how. Drawing on recent work
by legal scholars, historians, political scientists, and philosophers, this Article reinterprets the guarantee as the federal government’s obligation to secure freedom as
nondomination, and it argues that excellent, equitable public education is necessary
to fulfilling this duty. Nondomination, a robust conception of freedom, is freedom from
subjection to the will of others, protecting against potential interference and not merely
against actual interference. Nondomination has deep roots in American social movements and in the antislavery constitution, and it requires active government answerable to all people, prioritizing laws and institutions that constrain private as well as
public power. Under this theory of the republican guarantee, education has a potent
role in overcoming the costs of domination, which include psychological costs—
such as the atomization of citizens and their failure to see each other as equals—and
material costs—such as unpreparedness for democratic participation and individual
pursuit of the good life. Although a nondomination guarantee requires strong institutions outside of schools, education has a further role in equipping people with the
tools to resist domination when other institutions fail to prevent it. In laying out this
theory, this Article addresses both the conventional teaching that the republican
guarantee raises nonjusticiable political questions and the genuine conceptual challenge of lawmaking under an ongoing antidomination duty.
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INTRODUCTION
The instructor said,
Go home and write
a page tonight.
And let that page come out of you—
Then, it will be true.
....
So will my page be colored that I write?
Being me, it will not be white.
But it will be
a part of you, instructor.
You are white—
yet a part of me, as I am a part of you.
That’s American.
Sometimes perhaps you don’t want to be a part of me.
Nor do I often want to be a part of you.
But we are, that’s true!
As I learn from you,
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I guess you learn from me—
although you’re older—and white—
and somewhat more free.
This is my page for English B.
—Langston Hughes, Theme for English B1
For almost a month in early 2020, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that the United States Constitution protects a fundamental right to a basic minimum
education.2 The case was Gary B. v. Whitmer, the cause the conditions of Detroit,
Michigan public schools.3 Reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the case, a
Sixth Circuit panel used the doctrine of substantive due process to unearth the right
to a basic minimum education in the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The panel reasoned
that “[a]ccess to a foundational level of literacy . . . has an extensive historical
legacy and is so central to our political and social system as to be ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.’”5 Therefore, by complaining of unqualified teachers,
dangerous facilities, and inadequate learning materials, Detroit students had plausibly alleged the denial of their educational rights.6 Within a month of the panel’s
ruling, the parties settled the case,7 and the Sixth Circuit then took the unusual step
of deciding on its own to rehear the case en banc, thus vacating the panel decision
but leaving it as the last substantive decision in the case.8
1

LANGSTON HUGHES, Theme for English B, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON
HUGHES 409–10 (Arnold Rampersad ed., 1994).
2
Gary B. v. Whitmer (Gary B. I), 957 F.3d 616, 621, 642, 662 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated,
958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Scholars and court watchers alike noted the decision’s groundbreaking recognition of a fundamental right that the United States Supreme
Court has yet to acknowledge explicitly. E.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, A Constitutional
Right to Education Fulfills Our Democratic Promise, THE HILL (May 11, 2020, 3:00 PM EDT),
https://thehill.com/opinion/education/497149-a-constitutional-right-to-education-fulfills-our
-democratic-promise [https://perma.cc/CG7M-KZHQ]; Valerie Strauss & Derek W. Black,
Federal Court Delivers Holy Grail of Education Advocacy: A Fundamental Right to Basic
Education. Don’t Count on Supreme Court to Uphold It., WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/04/29/federal-court-delivers-holy-grail-education
-advocacy-fundamental-right-basic-education-don’t-count-supreme-court-uphold-it/ [https://
perma.cc/4JKQ-KH7T].
3
Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 620–21.
4
Id. at 642–55.
5
Id. at 642 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
6
Id.
7
Valerie Strauss, Michigan Settles Historic Lawsuit after Court Rules Students Have a
Constitutional Right to a ‘Basic’ Education, Including Literacy, WASH. POST (May 14, 2020,
12:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/05/14/michigan-settles-historic
-lawsuit-after-court-rules-students-have-constitutional-right-basic-education-including-lit
eracy/ [https://perma.cc/7QQC-A8SH].
8
See Gary B. v. Whitmer (Gary B. II), 958 F.3d 1216, 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
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Although relying explicitly on substantive due process doctrine, the panel focused on the necessity of education for republican government. Education, the panel
wrote, is “foundational to our system of self-governance”;9 “essential to nearly every
interaction between a citizen and her government”;10 and “at minimum, highly important to ‘maintaining our basic institutions.’”11 Courts, the panel noted, have
consistently identified education as a prerequisite to any meaningful democratic
participation or pursuit of happiness.12 Our constitutional framers and reframers
viewed robust, universal education as the bedrock of republicanism, without which
self-government would soon be six feet under.13
Given this focus, we might expect the Sixth Circuit panel to have based its
decision on Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, under which “[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every state in [the] union a republican form of government.”14 Yet
the panel invoked the republican guarantee only once, citing Charles Sumner’s view
that New England’s “system of common schools is part of the republican form of
government as understood by the framers of the Constitution.”15 Sumner, senator from
Massachusetts from 1851 to 1874, maintained that the Civil War in particular awoke
the republican guarantee, which “now comes forward with a giant’s power” to compel
the Reconstruction projects of emancipation, education, and enfranchisement.16
The Sixth Circuit is hardly alone in perceiving republican needs for excellent
and equitable public education while saying little else on the subject. Scholars have
argued that the republican guarantee is arguably the “most obvious constitutional
provision to anchor a constitutional right to education.”17 Federal and state judges
9

Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 662.
Id.
11
Id. at 644–45 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
12
Id. at 640 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923)); id. at 645 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954));
id. at 645–46 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–37 (1973));
id. at 646–47 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221).
13
See id. at 649–52, 654.
14
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
15
Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 650 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
16
See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867); see also WILLIAM M. WIECEK,
THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 188, 290–92 (1972); Arthur E. Bonfield,
The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN.
L. REV. 513, 541–43 (1962).
17
E.g., Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1059, 1072 (2019) [hereinafter Black, Fundamental Right]; see Derek W. Black, Implying a
Federal Constitutional Right to Education, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 135, 149–50 (Kimberly Jenkins Robinson ed.,
2019) [hereinafter FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION]; Peggy Cooper Davis, Education for
Sovereign People [hereinafter Davis, Education for Sovereign People], in FEDERAL RIGHT
TO EDUCATION, supra, at 164, 179–80; Kara A, Millonzi, Education as a Right of National
10
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too have proclaimed that education is essential to republican government.18 Beyond
this exhortation, however, the reasons given and the references to republicanism
have remained general. Meanwhile, the inequities and insufficiencies of American
public education worsen,19 accentuated by racial, wealth, and other gaps in access
to safe, high-quality learning during the COVID-19 pandemic and by our susceptibility to deep fakes, “fake news,” and the dangers of conspiracy thinking.20
Citizenship Under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
N.C. L. REV. 1286, 1286, 1303–09 (2003).
18
E.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 469 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205–06 (Ky. 1989) (citations omitted);
Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 39–41 (Cal. 1984); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585
P.2d 71, 94–95 (Wash. 1978); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1256–58 (Cal. 1971).
19
See, e.g., DEREK W. BLACK, SCHOOLHOUSE BURNING: PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE
ASSAULT ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 36–55, 226–50 (2020) [hereinafter BLACK, SCHOOLHOUSE
BURNING] (discussing contemporary crises facing public schools, especially from privatization advocates); Kristi L. Bowman, The Failure of Education Federalism, 51 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 11 (2017) (citing Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE
L.J. 1118, 1181 (2014)) (“[I]t is not only state legislatures but also state courts across the
country that appear to be increasingly amenable to a skin-and-bones night watchman state
in public education.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 113–15, 119–20 (2004); Colin M. Macleod, Just Schools and Good
Childhoods: Non-preparatory Dimensions of Educational Justice, 35 J. APPLIED PHIL. 76,
77 (2018) (citation omitted); Seth Moglen, Sharing Knowledge, Practicing Democracy: A
Vision for the Twenty-First-Century University, in EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY
267, 267 (Danielle Allen & Rob Reich eds., 2013) [hereinafter EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND
DEMOCRACY] (“Although democracy is a foundational value in our society, we live at a moment
of widespread pessimism about its effective, meaningful practice in the United States.”);
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access
to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 205–11 (2016) [hereinafter Robinson,
Fisher’s Cautionary Tale]; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, No Quick Fix for Equity and Excellence: The Virtues of Incremental Shifts in Education Federalism, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
201, 202–04 (2016).
20
See, e.g., JOEL BREAKSTONE ET AL., STUDENTS’ CIVIC ONLINE REASONING: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 4–5, 26–27 (2019), https://purl.stanford.edu/gf151tb4868 [https://perma
.cc/2NHQ-M9N2]; Kinga Bierwiaczonek, Jonas R. Kunst, & Olivia Pich, Belief in COVID19 Conspiracy Theories Reduces Social Distancing Over Time, 12 APPLIED PSYCH.: HEALTH
& WELL-BEING 1270, 1280–81 (2020); Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A
Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
1753, 1771–86 (2019); Tia Sherèe Gaynor & Meghan E. Wilson, Social Vulnerability and
Equity: The Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 832, 833 (2020);
Mordechai Gordon, Lying in Politics: Fake News, Alternative Facts, and the Challenges for
Deliberative Civics Education, 68 EDUC. THEORY 49, 51, 60–64 (2018); Clarence Gravlee,
Systemic Racism, Chronic Health Inequities, and COVID-19: A Syndemic in the Making?, 32
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In this Article, I confront our refusals to delve deeper. We conventionally teach
that republican guarantee claims raise political questions and thus are not justiciable.
In Part I, however, I argue that we are wrong to do so, offering four arguments.
First, this conventional teaching is based on a misinterpretation of Luther v. Borden,
which held not that all republican guarantee claims raise nonjusticiable political
questions but that the Supreme Court would defer to its coordinate branches in
deciding which of two competing state governments was legitimate.21 Second,
although the Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr rightly held that redistricting claims
are justiciable, the six factors it gifted us for discerning when a question is “political” are self-negating and on their own should not bar consideration of the republican guarantee.22 Third, the political question doctrine is, at least formally, premised
on a false divide between what is “political” and what is “judicial.” Fourth, to the
extent that the doctrine’s motivating concerns are that judges might not competently
decide certain disputes, such as disputes over educational rights, those concerns are
misplaced. Ultimately, the barrier that justiciability seems to pose is superficial,
merely concealing a weightier challenge.
Fundamentally, we ignore the republican guarantee because it imposes an obligation to bring about a demanding republicanism. Thus, in Part II, I reinterpret the
republican guarantee as a guarantee of nondomination. Nondomination is freedom
from being “subject to the will of others.”23 Whereas noninterference refers to freedom
from actual interference with one’s choices, nondomination refers to freedom from
potential interference when that potential is not suitably constrained. “If someone
is in a position to restrain and coerce you without being contested, then you are in
their power regardless of whether they happen to leave you be.”24 The upshot is that
nondomination is a more robust kind of liberty than mere noninterference. I explain
how recent scholarship has revived and refined an understanding of republicanism
organized around nondomination, a more compelling vision than one premised on
preserving certain constitutional structures for their own sakes. Moreover, I draw on
nondomination’s deep roots in the United States’ abolition, labor, and civil rights
traditions to explain some of nondomination’s key characteristics: it is freedom not
from law but through law; it is materialist freedom, presupposing the resources to
AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY e23482, at 5 (2020); Roland Imhoff & Pia Lamberty, A Bioweapon or
a Hoax? The Link Between Distinct Conspiracy Beliefs about the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) Outbreak and Pandemic Behavior, 11 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1110,
1114, 1116–17 (2020); Alina Tugend, These Students Are Learning About Fake News and
How to Spot It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/educa
tion/learning/news-literacy-2016-election.html [https://perma.cc/A9T9-XRPL].
21
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39–44 (1849).
22
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
23
PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF
DEMOCRACY 7 (2012) [hereinafter PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS].
24
LENA HALLDENIUS, MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST REPUBLICANISM 15
(2015) [hereinafter HALLDENIUS, MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT].
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make it effective; and it is universal, presuming the equal status of all members of
the would-be republic. In doing so, I try to show how we can understand the republican guarantee as establishing an antidomination duty, satisfied by eliminating
domination, or at least minimizing it, and achieving nondomination.
Finally, in Part III, I explain how education, as a form of antidomination, is a
necessary component of the republican guarantee. Robust public education is essential to negating two specific costs of domination. There are psychological costs, such
as failures to understand one another as equals, as well as material costs, such as a
lack of knowledge with which to resist domination. I briefly clarify that the goal of
republican education goes beyond merely inculcating civic virtue and requires
equipping students with the capability to resist domination when other institutions
fail to prevent it. In addition, I show how the convergence of equity and adequacy
in school reform evinces a growing appreciation for education’s antidomination role.
I then conclude this Article with an acknowledgment of the conceptual challenge that
an antidomination duty presents. Specifically, it constitutes an ongoing obligation; even
if we successfully redress one violation, there might well be many others outstanding. I describe the genuine difficulty of making laws to keep up with an ongoing
obligation, one that seems perfectionist, but I offer several responses and proposals
to meet the challenge.
My aims for this Article are threefold. First, I seek to show why our courts have
so far declined to hold that education is a fundamental right under the republican
guarantee. The reason that I give is not the usual one; it is less that the guarantee is
not justiciable than that we, and our courts, sense how challenging it will be to
deliver on the guarantee’s true purpose. Second, I reenvision that true purpose as an
antidomination duty, a kind of ratchet toward nondomination. Third, I propose how
excellent, equitable public education itself comprises antidomination. Education, in
this view, is not merely a fundamental right—if “right” can begin to convey all that
education is—but rather the most fundamental right, without which it is not possible
to vote or even to understand what it means to vote.25
I. A COURT MAY MAKE A REMARK
The republican guarantee sits at a fulcrum in the United States Constitution.
Between Articles I, II, and III, which establish our national political institutions, and
Articles V, VI, and VII, which set out the document’s instrumental character, Article
IV lays out substantive duties between the nation and its states.26 Article IV, Section
4 provides:
25

See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (observing that a right is fundamental at the very least when “preservative of all rights”).
26
E.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to give “full faith and credit” to other states’
laws); id. § 2 (guaranteeing citizens’ “privileges and immunities”); id. § 3 (regulating state admission to the union and congressional control of national land).
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The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a
republican form of government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the
executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic violence.27
Section 4 links internal to external: republicanism to national self-defense.28 This
reflects an old, twofold understanding of “a free people”: free only when exercising
independence from foreign powers and when exercising collective self-government,
its constituents undominated.29
Lawmakers and scholars have long contested what the republican guarantee entails.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress debated how much authority the guarantee afforded for restructuring states. Proslavery legislators contended that it merely
locked in eighteenth-century governance practices; prohibited monarchy; protected
wealthy Anglo-Americans’ rights; or, even more perversely, required the federal government to quell enslaved Americans’ uprisings.30 Antislavery legislators argued that
the guarantee required nothing less than abolition, universal public education, and
extending suffrage to Black people (or at least to Black men).31 Courts too weighed
in, interpreting republican government as securing (or not securing) specific rights, like
rights to assemble, to petition, to vote, and to be treated as equals under law.32 Lawmakers relied on originalist as well as dynamic modes of constitutional interpretation.33
27

Id. § 4.
Id.
29
See, e.g., QUENTIN SKINNER, MACHIAVELLI: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 62–63 (2d
ed. 2001); QUENTIN SKINNER, 1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 157
(1978).
30
WIECEK, supra note 16, at 291.
31
ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 30, 58 (2019); Bonfield, supra note 16, at 538–47 (discussing
congressional efforts to use the republican guarantee to reconstruct the South); Davis, Education
for Sovereign People, supra note 17, at 171–72, 179–81 (discussing Reconstruction arguments
for education as a corrective to the damage done by chattel slavery); Goodwin Liu, Education,
Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 377–78 (2006) (discussing congressional efforts to use the republican guarantee to establish universal public education).
32
E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 555 (1875) (citing Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874)) (arguing that republican government implies
equal rights, rights to assemble and petition, and yet not the right to vote).
33
Compare Salmon P. Chase, Address to the Southern and Western Liberty Convention,
in Cincinnati, Ohio (June 11, 1845) (“We insist that from the assembling of the First Congress
in 1774, until its final organization under the existing constitution in 1789, the American Government was anti-slavery in its character and policy.”), and ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE
LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
73–74 (1970) [hereinafter FONER, FREE SOIL] (describing Chase’s widely adopted antislavery
constitutionalism), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563–64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
28
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And although moderate free soil and non-extension doctrine overtook a more
demanding republicanism as the main antislavery interpretive mode,34 the republican
guarantee continued to be a “lodestar” during Reconstruction for developing education
and voting laws.35
Scholars in turn have interpreted the guarantee to protect individual democratic
participation rights;36 to protect popular sovereignty;37 to secure majority rule;38 to curb
majority rule’s excesses;39 to insulate states from federal regulation;40 to secure some
(“[A] system [that restricts liberty on the basis of race] is inconsistent with the [republican]
guarantee . . . .”), and Bonfield, supra note 16, at 541–42, 541 n.126 (describing Charles
Sumner’s and others’ dynamic understanding of republicanism).
34
See DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PROPHET OF FREEDOM 214 (2018)
(noting free soil ideology’s ascendance over the view that the pre-Reconstruction U.S. Constitution required abolishing slavery everywhere); FONER, FREE SOIL, supra note 33, at 73–76.
Legislators did rely on the republican guarantee, however, to lobby for and ratify the Reconstruction Amendments. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 161–62 (1951); David S. Louk, Reconstructing the Congressional
Guarantee of Republican Government, 73 VAND. L. REV. 673, 715–18 (2020).
35
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN.
L. REV. 735, 784, 775–94 (2018) [hereinafter Black, Constitutional Compromise] (discussing
congressional conditioning of states’ readmission to the union on their constitutional commitments to education).
36
Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
550, 602–03 (1992); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be
Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 851, 867 (1994) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Cases
Under the Guarantee Clause].
37
WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 24 (2001); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 (1994); see
Peggy Cooper Davis, Post-Colonial Constitutionalism, 44 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
1, 9 (2019) (arguing that the republican guarantee “can be understood to require a degree of
family sovereignty as a means of assuring the people’s sovereignty”).
38
Gabriel J. Chin, Justifying a Revised Voting Rights Act: The Guarantee Clause and the
Problem of Minority Rule, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1551, 1562–64 (2014); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Due
Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 640–41 (2014);
Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant: Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution’s
Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1954–55 (2012).
39
Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not “Republican Government”?, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159, 163–72 (1989). But see Eoin Daly, A Republican Defence of the
Constitutional Referendum, 35 LEGAL STUD. 30, 47–54 (2015) (arguing that direct
democracy can, but does not necessarily, comport with republican constitutionalism).
40
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36, 70 (1988); see Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee”
Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 611–12 (2018) (reading “guarantee” as an international law
term of art that might restrict standing to state governments).
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states against the deleterious effects of other states’ antidemocratic governance;41 to
prevent elite entrenchment and political lockup;42 to enable legislative deterrence of
vote suppression;43 to guard against not only eradication of republican government
but also its “death by a thousand cuts”;44 or to fulfill whatever commitments a reader
wants from the clause.45 Many of these interpretations might be right, if less for their
own sake than for their coincidence with a commitment to nondomination. Some
structural insights from the scholarship are independently valuable. For example, the
guarantee does not restrict republicanism either to the nation or to the states, and so
is best understood as securing at least two layers of republics.46 In addition, the
guarantee obligates “[t]he United States,”47 thus not one or two branches but all
three “in their appropriate spheres.”48
But lawmakers and scholars alike have sustained a mistaken view that courts
cannot resolve disputes under the republican guarantee, even when they recognize
its relevance.49 Such claims raise political questions, the conventional view holds,
41

Carolyn Shapiro, Democracy, Federalism, and the Guarantee Clause, 62 ARIZ. L. REV.
183, 193–97 (2020).
42
Ari J. Savitzky, The Law of Democracy and the Two Luther v. Bordens: A Counterhistory, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2028, 2065–68 (2011); Jarret A. Zafran, Referees of Republicanism:
How the Guarantee Clause Can Address State Political Lockup, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1418,
1449–55 (2016).
43
Cormac H. Broeg, Waking the Giant: A Role for the Guarantee Clause Exclusion Power
in the Twenty-First Century, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1358–62 (2020) (arguing that the republican guarantee allows Congress to exclude, or refuse to seat, representatives who benefited
from vote suppression efforts).
44
Jacob M. Heller, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause Regulation of
State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1716–17, 1727–34, 1748–49 (2010).
45
Richard L. Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfilled: An Argument
for the Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause Cases, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75, 82 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah
& Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (“‘Republicanism’ is an empty vessel to be filled by whatever
individual right the particular writer desires the courts to enforce.”).
46
See Shapiro, supra note 41, at 194 (citing WIECEK, supra note 16, at 26, 73). Indeed,
through vote suppression, gerrymandering, and other devices, elite capture of one state
government can have adverse “spillover” effects on other states, not least outsized power to
oppose national and international initiatives. See id. at 222–27.
47
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
48
Bonfield, supra note 16, at 523; see Louk, supra note 34, at 699 (describing each
branch as a “guarantor” of republican government); cf. Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood,
Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The Political Question Doctrine as a Justiciability
Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 427, 428 (2014) (“It is more accurate to say that when the Court has
discussed a ‘political question,’ it has referred to decisions appropriately made by another
branch, i.e., within that branch’s authority.”).
49
See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (citing Pac. States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)) (“This Court has several times concluded,
however, that the Guarantee Clause does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim.”);
Black, Fundamental Right, supra note 17, at 1072 (“[A]s neatly as an education right might
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and thus are not justiciable. Often courts have summarily dismissed them, providing
scant rationale; what reasoning they do provide tends to suggest a perceived mismatch between the character of a claim and the proper role of the court.50
Although legislative and executive actors have wide latitude to provide for
education under the guarantee, any general theory for doing so should confront our
judicial refusals to resolve republican guarantee disputes. Therefore, in this Part, I
raise four arguments against nonjusticiability: (1) the political question doctrine, at
least vis-à-vis the republican guarantee, rests on misread precedent; (2) the nonjusticiability considerations raised in Baker v. Carr are inconsistent and do not bar
republican guarantee claims; (3) the political question doctrine falsely divides the
“judicial” from the “political”; and (4) judicial incompetence concerns are overstated
and, more importantly, beside the point.
A. Misinterpreted Republican Guarantee Precedent
The doctrinal argument that courts cannot resolve republican guarantee claims
is based mainly on a misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Luther v.
Borden.51 The case concerned a crisis in Rhode Island between two state governments, each claiming to be legitimate.52 Between 1841 and 1842, Thomas Wilson
Dorr and other Rhode Islanders rebelled against their state government, which had
maintained its colonial charter as its constitution and continued to deny voting rights
to most of its citizens.53 The Dorr Rebellion briefly managed to set up a new state
government and eventually ratified a new state constitution, but not before triggering a little trespass dispute with a big upshot.54
In 1842, one Martin Luther, a rebellion supporter, sued one Luther Borden for
leading a posse of rebellion opponents into his house, searching for incriminating
evidence, and harassing his family.55 Borden argued that he had acted under the
charter government’s martial law, to which Luther responded that the Dorrite government was the true one.56 The case thus appeared to turn on which government
was legitimate. The Supreme Court decided, however, that it could not answer this
question.57 Roger Taney, eventual author of Dred Scott v. Sandford, wrote the opinion,
fit within the Guarantee Clause, the prospects of judicially enforcing a right to education through
the Guarantee Clause are relatively bleak given the Court’s general precedent in the area.”);
Hasen, supra note 45, at 75; Shapiro, supra note 41, at 184.
50
See Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause, supra note 36, at 849, 852–53.
51
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
52
Id. at 34–38.
53
WIECEK, supra note 16, at 85–110; see also GEORGE DENNISON, THE DORR WAR:
REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831–1861, 13–15, 32–109 (1976).
54
DENNISON, supra note 53, at 32–109; WIECEK, supra note 16, at 85–110; see also
Shapiro, supra note 41, at 197–99.
55
DENNISON, supra note 53, at 12–13; WIECEK, supra note 16, at 113–14.
56
WIECEK, supra note 16, at 114–15.
57
Luther, 48 U.S. at 42–47.
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arguing that Congress alone could determine which government was legitimate, and
Congress had not done so.58 Taney then assumed anyway that the charter government was legitimate and upheld the circuit court’s decision in favor of Borden.59
In Luther, the Court implied that “political” power differs from “judicial” power,
but it defined neither.60 Nor did it explain what makes a question “political” or “judicial.”61 State courts, Taney ventured, had not yet recognized the question of which
of multiple state governments was legitimate “as a judicial one.”62 Indeed, a state
court could not do so, because “[j]udicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws and enforcing [them], and of appointing judges to
expound and administer them.”63 But Taney justified the federal courts’ own inaction not on notions of “judicial” power but on the fact that neither Congress nor
the president had interceded first.64
Although the Court later invoked Luther to argue that all republican guarantee
claims are not justiciable,65 the decision held at most that the Court would not weigh
in on which state government was legitimate until other branches had.66 The Court
first botched this point in Taylor v. Beckham, while considering which candidates
in a disputed Kentucky election had been rightfully sworn in.67 The Court reached
the merits, determining that “no exigency [had] arisen” requiring the federal government to intercede under the republican guarantee, but the Court opined also that it
“must decline to take jurisdiction.”68 Notwithstanding its confused decision,69 the
Court misread Luther to have “long ago settled” that the guarantee is not justiciable.70
The Court then propped up this misreading in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Oregon, which concerned an Oregon telecommunications tax enacted by
ballot initiative.71 The Court rejected an argument that ballot initiatives violated the
58

Id. at 42.
Id. at 45–47. Taney’s assumption rested on then-president John Tyler’s empty pledge
to send federal troops to support the original charter government. Id. at 44; see DENNISON,
supra note 53, at 71–73; WIECEK, supra note 16, at 100–10, 117–18.
60
See Luther, 48 U.S. at 39–44.
61
See id.
62
Id. at 39.
63
Id. at 40.
64
See id. at 42–44.
65
E.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 143–48 (1912); Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578–81 (1900).
66
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 118 n.* (1980); Bonfield, supra note
16, at 535; Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause, supra note 36, at 861–62.
67
Taylor, 178 U.S. at 573–76.
68
Id. at 580.
69
See Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1908, 1932–33 n.129 (2015) (pointing out conflicting interpretations of Taylor as
decided on the merits or on jurisdiction).
70
See Taylor, 178 U.S. at 578.
71
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133–36 (1912).
59
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republican guarantee but insisted nonetheless that adjudicating the case would invite
countless challenges to state governance practices.72 Holding that the guarantee
presents only “political and governmental” questions, the Court relied on Taylor’s
gloss of Luther and explicitly refused to consider intervening precedents.73
Those intervening, post–Civil War cases undermine interpretations of Luther
that forbid courts from resolving republican guarantee claims. In Texas v. White, for
example, the Court held that it had jurisdiction over a disputed bond sale by Texas’s
wartime government.74 That government was illegitimate, the Court reasoned, because
the state could not actually secede from the union.75 Congress, therefore, met its
obligation under the republican guarantee to fix Texas’s “broken relations . . . with
the Union” by establishing a new, postwar government.76
In Minor v. Happersett, the Court advanced a substantive, albeit miserly,
interpretation of the republican guarantee, holding that it did not protect women’s
voting rights.77 Although the guarantee “necessarily implies a duty on [states]” to
provide republican government, wrote Chief Justice Waite for the Court, it merely
secured whatever rights had existed when states ratified the Constitution.78
Then, in United States v. Cruikshank, the Court carried this miserly interpretation forward to even more grotesque effect.79 Another Waite decision, Cruikshank
overturned the convictions of perpetrators of the Colfax massacre,80 the ultimately
“unpunished slaughter” of more than sixty-two African Americans by White supremacists in Colfax, Louisiana.81 Waite interpreted various constitutional rights as
arising from the republican guarantee and, as in Minor, emphasized the states’ duties
to secure republican government in the first instance.82 Among the decision’s more
72

Id. at 136–39, 141–42.
Id. at 151; see id. at 148 (“We do not stop to cite other cases which indirectly or incidentally refer to the [republican guarantee] . . . .”).
74
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726–32 (1869).
75
Id. at 721, 726.
76
Id. at 727–28; see also WIECEK, supra note 16, at 233–37 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s “lassitude” in setting out standards for republicanism in Texas v. White); Louk, supra
note 34, at 718–22 (interpreting Texas v. White as both judicial engagement with the republican guarantee and deference to Congress).
77
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874). Nor is the right to vote a
Fourteenth Amendment privilege or immunity, the Court opined, conceding that women “are
persons” and thus “may be citizens” under that Amendment. Id. at 165, 170–73.
78
Id. at 175–77.
79
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
80
Id. at 556–57, 559.
81
CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 251, 265–66 (2008); see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, 531 (1988) (“[Cruikshank]
rendered national prosecution of crimes committed against blacks virtually impossible, and
gave a green light to acts of terror where local officials either could not or would not enforce
the law.”).
82
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552–55.
73

104

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:91

puzzling aspects, however, is Waite’s further argument that “the people must look
to the States” to enforce federal rights.83 “The only obligation resting upon the United
States,” he wrote, “is to see that the States do not deny [their citizens’] right[s].”84
Yet Waite did not explain how the federal government could fulfill its “only obligation” short of interceding and either coercing or bypassing states when they would
not—and did not85—effectuate rights.
As the nineteenth century came to a close, the Court continued to adjudicate
disputes over the republican guarantee’s requirements.86 Although the Court has
never settled on an interpretation of the guarantee’s substance,87 the lesson here is
that for much of its history, the Court has generally treated the guarantee as justiciable. It has declined to do so when relying on its misinterpretation of Luther.88 In recent
years, moreover, scholars have observed the political question doctrine’s decline,89
and the Court itself has acknowledged that the doctrine does not bar all republican
guarantee claims.90
83

Id. at 552.
Id. at 555.
85
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 10–17, 62–69, 385–442 (2004).
86
E.g., Att’y Gen. of Mich. ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905); Forsyth
v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891). Justice
O’Connor acknowledged these cases on the republican guarantee’s merits in her opinion in
New York v. United States. 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) (citations omitted) (“In a group of cases
decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability [in
Pacific States], the Court addressed the merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause
without any suggestion that the claims were not justiciable.”).
87
See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 16, at 238–43, 254–63; Louk, supra note 34, at 677–78.
88
E.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (citing Pac. States Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)). The Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho can be
understood as limited to partisan gerrymandering, which the Court has long considered
controversial. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926 (2018). Moreover, to consider the
claims in Rucho as nonjusticiable because political is impossible to square with other recent
political decisions. See generally, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140
S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019); Shelby Cnty. v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012);
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Crawford v. Marion
Cnty. Elec. Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); cf. Laurence Claus,
A Republic, If the Courts Can Keep It?, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 395, 409 (2020) (contending that
“[t]he Court has been finding political questions in all the wrong places,” for example in
Rucho and not in cases like Shelby County).
89
E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 336 (2002); Jesse
H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1459
(2005) (noting consensus that “political questions are in serious decline” because they are
“clearly at odds with the [Court’s recent turn to] judicial supremacy”); Matthew L. M.
Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 674 (2006).
90
E.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 185 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964))
84
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B. The Self-Negating Political Question Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s formulation of “political” questions in Baker v. Carr likewise cannot bar republican guarantee claims.91 With Baker, the Court arguably launched
the Reapportionment Revolution,92 overturning its refusal to hear congressional
malapportionment claims in Colegrove v. Green.93 Writing for the Court in Colegrove,
Justice Frankfurter opined famously that to resolve such claims “would cut very
deep into the very being of Congress” and that courts “ought not to enter this political thicket.”94 But in Baker, the Court defied Justice Frankfurter’s admonition,
holding that such claims are justiciable.95 Although in the opinion Justice Brennan
left the Court’s misreading of Luther in place,96 he nonetheless “consider[ed] the
contours of the ‘political question’ doctrine” in order to show how it did not apply.97
Under Justice Brennan’s formulation, questions are “political” where their
resolution (1) is committed to another branch by constitutional text, (2) is precluded
by “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” (3) would require
“an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” (4)
would require disrespecting another branch, (5) would require “unquestioning adherence” to prior policy determinations, or (6) would result in conflicting resolutions
by different branches.98 These considerations did not control Baker’s outcome, but
they comprise maneuvers with which the Court can avoid cases or prescribe other
branches’ authority.99
The Baker considerations do not apply to republican guarantee claims, to the
extent that they make sense at all. Considerations one and six (constitutional text and
interbranch conflict) can apply at most when text provides that courts shall not
(observing that “perhaps not all claims under the [republican guarantee] present nonjusticiable
political questions”).
91
369 U.S. 186, 209–10 (1962).
92
See, e.g., Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 475–76, 481 (1968) (prescribing “one
person, one vote” for county and local government districting); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577–78,
586–87 (same for state legislature districting); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5–7, 18 (1964)
(same for congressional districting); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (devising the
“one person, one vote” standard). I write “arguably,” because two years prior to Baker, the
Court decided Gomillion v. Lightfoot, holding that racial gerrymanders are justiciable and
violate the Fifteenth Amendment. 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960).
93
328 U.S. 549, 550–51, 556.
94
Id. at 556.
95
Baker, 369 U.S. at 187–95, 197–98.
96
Id. at 219–23; see Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes
and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 106 & n.15 (2000).
97
Baker, 369 U.S. at 209–10.
98
Id. at 217.
99
See Grove, supra note 69, at 1914 (observing that, in Baker, the Court “claimed the
power to decide whether, and the extent to which, any other branch may be involved in constitutional decisionmaking”).
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consider a given issue; otherwise, these considerations challenge the entirety of
judicial review.100 And as mentioned above, the republican guarantee itself attaches
an obligation to “the United States,” meaning all branches, not just one or two.101
Consideration two (manageable standards) would likewise vitiate the entire judicial
enterprise if taken seriously, given the inevitable lack of known standards prior to
adjudicating a given issue or even to establishing a court to adjudicate it.102 Considerations three, four, and five (policy determinations and interbranch respect) in fact
weigh in favor of adjudication. Courts have made and will continue to make law and
policy, interbranch contestation is the point of mixed government, and respect and reputation should guide how, not whether, courts decide cases.103 Uncritically reciting the
existence of Baker “political” questions, even more than misreading Luther, amounts
only to deceiving ourselves about how courts and governments really function. We
should take care not to do so and unwittingly rule out republican guarantee claims.
C. The False Political-Judicial Divide
Beyond mistaken doctrine, the formal distinction between the “political” and the
“judicial” misrepresents reality. The distinction’s apparent import is that courts, because they are “judicial,” ought to decide “judicial” claims but not “political” ones.104
The argument depends on a premise that courts are not also political, a premise too
rarely interrogated.105 Even the doctrine’s critics consistently, perhaps habitually,
100

See, e.g., Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888, 926 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (Liu, J., dissenting from denial of review) (“The potential for conflict between
courts and the [other] branches is inherent in the power of judicial review.”); Martin H. Redish,
Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1060–61 (1985) (rejecting the political question doctrine’s “asserted rationales” as incoherent, not least because
courts’ avoidance of “political” questions is self-negating).
101
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text; accord Chemerinsky, Cases Under the
Guarantee Clause, supra note 36, at 871.
102
See Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause, supra note 36, at 871 (“[T]here
is no reason why ‘republican form of government’ is more lacking in standards than ‘due
process’ or ‘equal protection.’”); accord McConnell, supra note 96, at 105–07.
103
See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
17–36 (1981) (describing courts’ administrative functions, especially social control and
conflict resolution, as well as courts’ lawmaking functions, especially common law judging
and ordering remedies); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (describing the value of
interbranch contestation and of democratic contestation more broadly). For further arguments
on how Baker does not foreclose republican guarantee questions, see Chemerinsky, Cases
Under the Guarantee Clause, supra note 36, at 872–74.
104
See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019); Pac. States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133 (1912). But cf. Barkow, supra note 89, at 245–46 (“[Political
questions] become ‘political’ [merely] in the sense that, after that determination, their resolution is left to the political branches.”).
105
Cf. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 168 (1916) [hereinafter DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION] (“Words, the counters for ideals, are, however, easily taken for ideas.”).
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describe “the political branches” as excluding the judiciary.106 But consider the words
themselves. In our constitutional lexicon, “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial” are
of the same ilk,107 whereas “political”—relating to government or engaging in governance—pertains to all three.108 The opposite of “political” is “apolitical”—having no
relation to government or governance—not “legal,” and certainly not “judicial.”
In terms of the institutions to which these words refer, the political-judicial
divide makes even less sense. In his lectures on law, James Wilson observed:
[W]e hear the legislature mentioned as the people’s representatives. The distinction, . . . probably[] not avowed upon reflection, is, that the executive and judicial powers are not connected
with the people by a relation so strong, or near, or dear. But[] we
should look upon the different parts of government with a just
and impartial eye. The executive and judicial powers are now
drawn from the same source, are now animated by the same
principles, and are now directed to the same ends, with the
legislative authority: they who execute, and they who administer
the laws, are as much the servants, and therefore as much the
friends of the people, as they who make them.109
Each branch of government undertakes (1) lawmaking and (2) administration on behalf of the people, deriving its authority to govern from them, and is thus political.110
The legislative enacts statutes as well as conducts investigations and hearings; the
executive issues regulation as well as investigates, adjudicates, and rectifies noncompliance; and the judicial devises, revises, and negates laws as well as resolves
individual disputes.111 Moreover, “[t]he very notion of a countermajoritarian difficulty,
long disputed by positive political scientists, presupposes that courts stand courageously
106

E.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 242–44 (2011); Chemerinsky, Cases Under
the Guarantee Clause, supra note 36, at 862–63; Redish, supra note 100, at 1059–60; Skinner,
supra note 48, at 431.
107
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, with id. art. II, § 1, and id. art. III, § 1.
108
Indeed, in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court described certain executive powers
as “political” because based in “discretion,” not because counterpoised to judicial powers.
See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164–67, 169–70 (1803). Moreover, the Court referred to itself as
one of the “political institutions” improved by a written constitution. See id. at 178.
109
JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 293 (Robert
Green McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter WORKS OF JAMES WILSON].
110
See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 49–54 (1952); Josh Chafetz, Governing and Deciding Who Governs, 2015
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 111 (2015) (citation omitted) (“Courts govern all the time, simply because
that is what it is to make decisions that control the actions and interactions of others.”).
111
See SHAPIRO, supra note 103, at 17–21. Along these lines, arguments that “political”
means “engaged in lawmaking” fail to account for common law adjudication.
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(if unaccountably) apart from society, as a ‘they’ rather than a ‘we.’”112 What makes
each branch political is its representative role, not the manner in which its officers
are installed.
Nor should we conflate being political with being partisan. Judges have long
cultivated an air of independence from partisan politicking,113 whether they have
succeeded or not.114 Whether courts can enhance their credibility by being nonpartisan does not absolve them of their duty to resolve all questions put to them by the
people, even “political” ones. A sometime author of the political-judicial divide,
Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless wrote:
The judiciary cannot . . . avoid a measure because it approaches
the confines of the constitution. . . . With whatever doubts, with
whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if
it be brought before us. . . . Questions may occur which we would
gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.115
Some scholars have warned against eliminating “political” questions or resuscitating the republican guarantee, perhaps due to a rise in judicial supremacy and judges’
unavoidable, if minimizable, partisanship.116 Concerns for fairness and effective
democratic processes will always be valid. “[W]hen a robust version of judicial
interpretive supremacy is combined with a narrow construction of key enumerated
powers, there is a serious danger that the Court will disable the government from
addressing critical national problems.”117 However, such concerns should lead us not
112

Jamal Greene, (Anti)Canonizing Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 157, 158 (2014) (citing Robert
A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957)).
113
See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,
488 (1903) (“Unless we are prepared to supervise [Alabama] voting . . . it seems to us that
all that the [voting discrimination] plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.”).
But cf. CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, Hero and Leander, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE 193, 204 (Patrick Cheney & Brian J. Striar eds., 2006) (“What virtue
is it that is born with us? / Much less can honour be ascribed thereto, / Honour is purchased
by the deeds we do.”).
114
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pamela S.
Karlan, Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (“The Court’s dismissive
treatment of [the democratic process] raises the question whether, and for how long, the people
will maintain their confidence in a Court that has lost its confidence in them and their leaders.”).
115
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
116
E.g., Hasen, supra note 45, at 77; Barkow, supra note 89, at 317–35.
117
Karlan, supra note 114, at 69; cf. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG:
HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 234–35 (2011) (“[N]othing in the Constitution gives the judiciary exclusive authority over its meaning or enforcement.”); LARRY
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 233–41 (2004) (critiquing contemporary judicial supremacy).
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to leave “political” questions unanswered but to invite judges to consider them.118
Courts must guard their credibility, and when judges, like other representatives,
must answer petitions put to them, they risk answering unwisely, even embarrassing
themselves or triggering reprisal.119 “[I]t is surely preferable for conflicts to be stated
openly so that the actions of the court can be more fairly evaluated: the policymaking
power of the Court hardly vanishes merely because the Court isn’t transparent about
the implications of its actions.”120
D. Overstated Judicial Incompetence Concerns
Finally, we give too much credit to judicial incompetence concerns. Courts
uninterested in resolving republican guarantee (and other) disputes have long voiced
these worries, arguing that they lack the necessary expertise.121 But judicial incompetence arguments tend to conflate judges’ past demonstrated ability to resolve such
disputes with judges’ actual institutional capabilities and their possible exercise in
the future. Consider Juliana v. United States, in which a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
panel held that a lawsuit brought by youth seeking to enjoin the federal government
118

See Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888, 929 (2016) (Cuéllar,
J., dissenting from denial of review) (“[N]ever have [separation of powers] principles meant
that we should strain to avoid our responsibility . . . simply because the right at issue touches
on concerns the Legislature might ultimately address, or because the task . . . demands careful
attention to the proper role of courts as well as our sister branches.”).
119
See, e.g., JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH
RIGHTS IS TEARING AMERICA APART 164 (2021) [hereinafter GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT
WRONG]; FRANK LOVETT, A REPUBLIC OF LAW 191–92 (2016) [hereinafter LOVETT, REPUBLIC
OF LAW] (observing that however a legislature defines courts’ jurisdiction, “[t]he most important challenge will be ensuring that some mechanism exists for holding courts accountable
for properly exercising whatever legislative authority they may possess”); Michael S. Kang
& Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election
Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1447 (2016) (finding that judges’ partisan loyalty “appears to
be tempered by the potential for public exposure”).
120
SCOTT E. LEMIEUX & DAVID J. WATKINS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC THEORY: POWER, DOMINATION, AND THE COURTS 73–74 (2018); accord LOVETT,
REPUBLIC OF LAW, supra note 119, at 171–72; cf. Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the
Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 727 (2014) (critiquing Shelby
County v. Holder as “audacious, rather than modest” and for “creat[ing] new law without
adequate justification which limits congressional power to enforce voting rights”).
121
E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–81 (2004); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37, 41 (1973); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1946); see
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1263 (1978) (“The federal courts comprise a crucial bulwark
against evulsive depredations of constitutional values; but against scattered erosion they are
relatively powerless.”); Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role
of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 97–103 (2010) (discussing judges’ concerns regarding line-drawing and identifying constitutional violations).
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“to implement a plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess
atmospheric CO2” was not redressable by Article III judges.122 The panel contended that
“any effective plan would necessarily require a host of complex policy decisions entrusted, for better or worse, to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative
branches.”123 Yet the panel did not explain why it lacked the ability to issue any
relief at all, even conceding that it could issue an order “goad[ing] the [other] branches
into action.”124 Thus, Judge Staton observed in dissent, the panel’s “real concerns
[lay] not in the judiciary’s ability to draw a line between lawful and unlawful conduct, but in our ability to equitably walk the government back from that line without
wholly subverting the authority of our coequal branches.”125 Common law judges
have great discretion, however, to devise tailored, enforceable remedies without denying that such remedies exist, and an initial lack of standards never stops them
from pressing onward, as they must.126
Ultimately, incompetence is beside the point. Even if courts were once “not capable of understanding social science facts or overseeing reform processes,” those
concerns have “largely abated” in light of “overwhelming evidence” to the contrary.127
Education law scholars, for example, have imagined various models for courts to
engage with complex issues like educational adequacy, from overseeing legislatures’
“fiduciary” duties to provide education,128 to serving as a “catalyst” for legislative
or executive action,129 to engaging in a “colloquy” with other branches.130 Which
122

947 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1171.
124
See id. at 1171–73, 1175. But see id. at 1175 (Staton, J., dissenting) (“No case can singlehandedly prevent the catastrophic effects of climate change predicted by the government and
scientists. But a federal court need not manage all of the delicate foreign relations and
regulatory minutiae implicated by climate change to offer real relief, and the mere fact that
this suit cannot alone halt climate change does not mean that it presents no claim suitable for
judicial resolution.”).
125
Id. at 1188 (Staton, J., dissenting).
126
See id. at 1189 (“Courts routinely grant plaintiffs less than the full gamut of requested
relief, and our inability to compel legislation . . . speaks nothing to our ability to enjoin the
government from exercising its discretion in violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”);
see also Justin Driver, Rules, the New Standards: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Manageability after Vieth v. Jubelirer, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1166, 1182–85 (2005) (arguing that
“judicially manageable standards” need only be standards and not immediately transformed
into rules); supra note 106 and accompanying text.
127
See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1537 (2007) [hereinafter Rebell, “Meaningful”
Educational Opportunity].
128
Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 705–07, 756–67
(2012).
129
William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination
of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1185, 1241, 1297–98 (2003).
130
Rebell, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, supra note 127, at 1539–42.
123
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approach courts adopt will not change the need for their involvement in such
disputes. “[I]t is precisely because the legislative and executive branches have failed
to target funds in an equitable and effective manner that constitutional rights have
been violated and courts have felt compelled to take jurisdiction of these cases.”131
Lastly, to the extent that competence is a matter of capacity—meaning not enough
judges to handle the courts’ caseload—well, there is an obvious solution for that.132
***
Taking these arguments together, there is no reason to perpetuate and give
outsized importance to the political question doctrine.133 The federal courts, just the
same as Congress and the executive branch, must enforce the republican guarantee.
The real question, to borrow Justin Driver’s words, “is not whether the courtroom
offers the ideal forum . . . but whether it has been the necessary forum.”134 Just as “the
desire for political power cannot be destroyed, but at most, channeled into different
forms,” the people’s complaints will always find their way to some kind of resolution.135
II. SHINE, CHERISHED REPUBLIC
If courts can work with the republican guarantee, and given that legislatures and
executives always could, then the question becomes: what does the guarantee? In this
Part, I interpret the guarantee as an antidomination duty on the federal government.
I explain that the organizing principle of republicanism is freedom as nondomination,
which is freedom not from mere interference but from the uncontrolled capacity for
131

Id. at 1538. Indeed, courts’ demonstrations that they can adjudicate educational adequacy
cases have even inspired arguments that they can adjudicate partisan gerrymandering cases too,
contrary to the frequent hand-wringing. E.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational
Adequacy to Representational Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan
Gerrymanders, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1632–35 (2018).
132
See ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 4 (2019) (distinguishing capacity, “the total volume of
cases” that courts can handle, from competence, the ability “to produce reliably good decisions,”
and from independence, the “inclination . . . to produce social change against the tide of
dominant political forces”).
133
Cf. EMILY DICKINSON, A Man may make a Remark (952), in THE COMPLETE POEMS
OF EMILY DICKINSON 446 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., 1960) (“Let us deport—with skill— / Let
us discourse—with care— / Powder exists in Charcoal / Before it exists in Fire.”).
134
JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 19 (2018) [hereinafter DRIVER, SCHOOLHOUSE
GATE]; see id. (citing Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J.)
(“[T]hese are social and political problems which seem at times to defy such resolution. In
such situations . . . the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to assist in the
solution where constitutional rights hang in the balance.”)).
135
See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1999).
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interference. As a commitment to republicanism, therefore, the republican guarantee
requires that the branches of the federal government eliminate (or minimize) domination through their respective powers. I do not belabor arguments either that republicanism is a mere catch-all or that our framers and reframers did not provide a
blueprint for “a republican form of government,”136 showing instead that nondomination
both has desirable features and has deep roots in our history.
A. The Instrumental Turn in Republicanism
Since the middle of the twentieth century, scholars have devoted increasing
attention to republicanism and to its roots in the revolutions and quasi-revolutions
of early modern Europe.137 Convention had taught that the United States, notwithstanding separation from the British Empire, maintained a constitutionalism continuous with the metropole’s.138 Historians demonstrated, however, that the American
framers in fact broke sharply from prevailing British views, looking instead to republican thinkers from seventeenth-century England, the seventeenth-century Netherlands, and the northern Italian city-states of the European Renaissance.139 Of course,
the seventeenth-century English republicanism of Algernon Sidney, James Harrington, John Milton, and the Levellers had itself appropriated earlier Florentine and
Venetian ideas.140
In the final decades of the twentieth century, legal scholars in particular began to
consider this legacy’s effects on our laws.141 They focused on identifying which
features of republicanism our Constitution and government embody, including: popular
136

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
See generally Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972).
138
See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 506–13 (1975).
139
E.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
22–54 (1967); POCOCK, supra note 138, at 506–52; CAROLINE ROBBINS, ABSOLUTE LIBERTY:
A SELECTION FROM THE ARTICLES AND PAPERS OF CAROLINE ROBBINS 55–58, 267–348
(Barbara Taft ed., 1982); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776–1787, at 18–28, 32–36, 48–53, 197–206, 423–25 (1969).
140
See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note 138, at 334 (“Republican and Machiavellian ideas had to
become domiciled in an environment dominated by monarchical, legal, and theological concepts apparently in no way disposed to require the definition of England as a polis or the
Englishman as a citizen.”); see generally PHILIP BOBBITT, THE GARMENTS OF COURT AND
PALACE: MACHIAVELLI AND THE WORLD THAT HE MADE (2013); ARIHIRO FUKUDA, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SWORD: HARRINGTON, HOBBES, AND MIXED GOVERNMENT IN THE ENGLISH
CIVIL WARS (1997); MACHIAVELLI AND REPUBLICANISM (Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, &
Maurizio Viroli eds., 1990).
141
E.g., Amar, supra note 37; Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J.
1685 (1988); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival]; Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 60–63 (1990).
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sovereignty;142 anti-corruption;143 pluralism;144 political equality;145 active citizenship,
deliberation, and civic virtue;146 and federalism.147 Yet despite renewed attention to
republicanism, some have lamented the apparent failures of this theorizing “to live
up to its promise.”148 The ostensibly republican features that theorists emphasized are
excellent, necessary even, but they do not on their own explain republican government’s raison d’être.
But our understanding of republicanism has taken an “instrumental turn.”149
Legal theory developed during the so-called republican revival tended to cast devices
like popular sovereignty and civic virtue as “intrinsically valuable components” of
republicanism.150 In the last two decades, however, scholars have shown how these
devices are merely instrumental to republicanism’s organizing principle: freedom as
nondomination, also known as republican liberty.151 Understanding the republic in this
way heeds its underlying purpose in advancing this robust, deeply felt freedom.152
142

Amar, supra note 37, at 749.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT 14–21 (2011); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 276–90 (2014) [hereinafter TEACHOUT,
CORRUPTION IN AMERICA]; Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 103, 106–20 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 118, 121–30 (2010); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 341, 344 (2009).
144
Michelman, supra note 141, at 1507–15.
145
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 141, at 1552–53.
146
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 134–36 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 145–56 (1995);
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 141, at 1548–51, 1555–58.
147
Merritt, supra note 40, at 3–10.
148
See Sherry, supra note 146, at 134 (citing Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career
of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 12–13 (1992)); see also ADAMS, supra note 37, at 96–97;
West, supra note 141, at 62–63.
149
Frank Lovett, Republicanism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 19, 2006), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/ [https://perma.cc/BQ4W-9DEM].
150
Id.
151
E.g., PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 7; PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 50 (1997) [hereinafter PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM]; QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM ix–x (1998); David Watkins,
Institutionalizing Freedom as Non-Domination: Democracy and the Role of the State, 47
POLITY 508, 513–14 (2015).
152
See, e.g., Letter from Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams, March 1776, in MERCY OTIS
WARREN: SELECTED LETTERS 69, 70 (Jeffrey H. Richards & Sharon M. Harris eds., 2009) [hereinafter WARREN: SELECTED LETTERS] (“But we will yet hope the present generation will
leave [‘a perfect Commonwealth’] to posterity,—and that the American republic will come as
near the point of perfection, as the condition of humanity will admit.”); WOOD, supra note 139,
at 47 (“Republicanism meant more for Americans than simply the elimination of a king and the
institution of an elective system. It added a moral dimension, a utopian depth, to the political
separation from England[.]”).
143
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The instrumental turn in republican thought has itself flowered into a global discourse. Some scholars continue to set out general republican theory,153 in transnational contexts,154 and by questioning conventional source readings.155 Others have
excavated the history of American social movements correcting or resolving contradictions in our framers’ asserted republicanism.156 Others still have scrutinized
individual thinkers’ work,157 or have considered republican schools, workplaces, and
markets.158 This more focused republicanism has begun to surface in American legal
scholarship,159 but it deserves greater attention.
153

E.g., LEMIEUX & WATKINS, supra note 120; FRANK LOVETT, A GENERAL THEORY OF
DOMINATION AND JUSTICE 157–89 (2010) [hereinafter LOVETT, DOMINATION AND JUSTICE];
LOVETT, REPUBLIC OF LAW, supra note 119, at 171–72; PHILIP PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM: A
MORAL COMPASS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (2014) [hereinafter PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM];
PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 7.
154
E.g., EOIN DALY & TOM HICKEY, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION:
REPUBLICANISM AND THE BASIC LAW (2015); CÉCILE LABORDE, CRITICAL REPUBLICANISM: THE
HIJAB CONTROVERSY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1–4 (2008); Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The
Republican Foundations of International Law, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 187, 187–94 (Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí eds., 2009)
[hereinafter LEGAL REPUBLICANISM]; Yiftah Elazar & Geneviève Rousselière, Introduction:
Republicanizing Democracy, Democratizing the Republic, in REPUBLICANISM AND THE
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 1, 4–9 (Yiftah Elazar & Geneviève Rousselière eds., 2019).
155
E.g., LAWRENCE HAMILTON, FREEDOM IS POWER: LIBERTY THROUGH POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION 1–8 (2014); JOHN MCCORMICK, MACHIAVELLIAN DEMOCRACY vii–ix
(2011); CAMILA VERGARA, SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION: CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS FOR AN ANTIOLIGARCHIC REPUBLIC 2–6 (2020); Nadia Urbinati, Competing for Liberty: The Republican
Critique of Democracy, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 607, 607–08 (2012).
156
E.g., ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH:
LABOR AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 7–11 (2015); AZIZ RANA,
THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 2–4 (2014); Melvin L. Rogers, Race, Domination,
and Republicanism, in DIFFERENCE WITHOUT DOMINATION: PURSUING JUSTICE IN DIVERSE
DEMOCRACIES 59, 59–64 (Danielle Allen & Rohini Somanathan eds., 2020) [hereinafter Rogers,
Race, Domination, and Republicanism].
157
E.g., ANDREW HADFIELD, SHAKESPEARE AND REPUBLICANISM (2005); HALLDENIUS,
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 24; Melvin L. Rogers, David Walker: Citizenship,
Judgment, Freedom, and Solidarity, in AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: A COLLECTED HISTORY 52, 52–55 (Melvin L. Rogers & Jack Turner eds., 2021) [hereinafter Rogers,
David Walker].
158
E.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES
(AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) vii–xii (2017) [hereinafter ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT]; GEOFFREY HINCHLIFFE, LIBERTY AND EDUCATION: A CIVIC REPUBLICAN APPROACH
(2015); K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2017) [hereinafter RAHMAN,
DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION]; ROBERT S. TAYLOR, EXIT LEFT: MARKETS AND
MOBILITY IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT (2017).
159
E.g., Jack M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1427, 1431–37 (2016); Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial
Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1429–31 (2008) [hereinafter Dawood, Antidomination Model]; Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U.
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The republican guarantee is best understood as a nondomination guarantee,
imposing on the federal government a duty to undertake antidomination. Many of
the guarantee interpretations that others have offered coincide with my interpretation
(at least somewhat); the norms that they raise are either instrumental to or result
from nondomination.160 In the following sections, I explain in greater detail what
nondomination is. In particular, I explain how freedom from involuntary servitude
epitomizes nondomination and how nondomination 1) is freedom not from law but
through law; 2) is materialist, presuming the resources needed to realize it; and 3)
is universal, presuming as its subjects all people who live within a would-be republic.
To explain these aspects of republican liberty, and thus the heart of the republican guarantee, I draw on the instrumental turn while focusing on the American
tradition. In doing so, I show how nondomination is at home in our constitutional
law and how it is more consistent with our national struggles and progress than other
proposed purposes of the guarantee. For example, it respects the antislavery constitutionalism of the early to mid-nineteenth century that sought to remake the republicanism that the founding generations asserted but then controverted with their own
systems of domination, especially chattel slavery and settler colonialism. Under this
view, the republican guarantee commits to Americans’ lived experience of freedom,
down to the last person, and obligates the federal government to redress domination
where it arises.161
B. A Guarantee Against Domination
What, then, is liberty as nondomination? In short, it is freedom not from mere
interference but from subjection to another’s will, or domination.162 If this sense of
freedom feels unfamiliar, it can help to start with an account more commonly on offer
today, Isaiah Berlin’s negative-positive dichotomy.163 Negative freedom, as Berlin
explained, is noninterference; I am free “to the degree to which no human being
L. REV. 669, 670–73 (2014); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional
Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism, 94 TEX.
L. REV. 1329, 1345–52 (2016); Zephyr Teachout, Antitrust Law, Freedom, and Human Development, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1081, 1110 (2020).
160
See supra notes 36–45 and 148–53 and accompanying text.
161
See, e.g., TENBROEK, supra note 34, at 50 (citing JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY: TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THAT SUBJECT (1849)).
162
PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 153, at xv (citing LOVETT, DOMINATION AND
JUSTICE, supra note 153, at 236–38).
163
ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 3–57 (Oxford Univ. Press 1958). Another
famous account of liberty is Benjamin Constant’s ancient-modern dichotomy. See BENJAMIN
CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns, in CONSTANT:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 310–12 (Biancamaria Fontana ed., 1988) (contrasting ancient
collective sovereignty with modern individual self-direction).
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interferes with my activity” and unfree when “prevented by other persons from doing
what I want.”164 Noninterference is “not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or self-government.”165 Positive freedom, in contrast, is self-mastery; I am free
when “a subject, not an object” and when “moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me . . . from outside.”166
Positive freedom entails perceiving oneself “as a thinking, willing, active being,
bearing responsibility for [one’s] choices and able to explain them by reference to
[one’s] own ideas and purposes.”167
Freedom as nondomination far predates the negative-positive dichotomy, but it
remains potent today nonetheless.168 In his Discourses on the First Ten Books of
Livy, Niccolò Machiavelli refined this vision of freedom, rooted in ancient Rome
and regrown during the Renaissance of northern Italy.169 On whether the people or
elites best preserve freedom, he wrote:
If we consider the aims of elites and the people, then we see
without doubt that elites desire to dominate and the people desire
not to be dominated; thus the people have a greater will to live
freely, being less able to exploit liberty than elites. Guardians of
liberty, the people will take greater care of it, unable to keep it
from others and so not allowing others to keep it from them.170
Republican freedom thus contrasts with domination, which “refers not to any actual
interference, but rather to the ability to interfere when that ability is not suitably
controlled.”171 Power is not suitably controlled “to the extent that its exercise is not
subject to effective and reliable constraints that are common knowledge to all
164

BERLIN, supra note 163, at 7.
Id. at 14.
166
Id. at 16.
167
Id.
168
See Frank Lovett, Non-Domination, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREEDOM 106,
108–09 (David Schmidtz & Carmen E. Pavel eds., 2018) [hereinafter Lovett, Non-Domination]
(citing ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE (1991)).
169
See QUENTIN SKINNER, 1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 2–112,
139–89 (1978) (recounting the spread of republican liberty as an ideal in the northern Italian
city-states from the twelfth through sixteenth centuries); Orlando Patterson, Freedom, Slavery,
and Identity in Renaissance Florence: The Faces of Leon Battista Alberti, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FREEDOM 194, 198 (David Schmidtz & Carmen E. Pavel eds., 2018) (describing fifteenth-century Florentines’ obsession with liberty).
170
See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio [Discourses
on Livy] I.5, in NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI: TUTTE LE OPERE 269, 324 (Mario Martelli ed.,
Bompiani 2018) (1531) (It.).
171
Lovett, Non-Domination, supra note 168, at 109; accord PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S
TERMS, supra note 23, at 27–28, 56–59, 296.
165
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persons or groups concerned.”172 The potential for interference, with or without actual
interference, is domination’s most striking feature.
Meanwhile, domination’s clearest manifestation has been slavery, in particular
chattel slavery.173 Orlando Patterson has described slavery as “the permanent, violent
domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.”174 It is “one of
the most extreme forms” of domination, if not the most extreme form, “approaching
the limits of total power from the viewpoint of the master, and of total powerlessness from the viewpoint of the [en]slave[d].”175 Traditionally, republicanism has
traced the freedom-slavery dichotomy to ancient Rome, though of course involuntary
servitude has been ubiquitous.176 Moreover, we should not construe as epitomizing
domination the abstract political “slavery” that Anglo-American revolutionaries invoked to justify separation from the British Empire.177 “A full account of republicanism,
and of freedom as nondomination, must . . . address the conditions of domination
that attach to a phenomenon like chattel slavery, namely social death.”178
1. Nondomination as Freedom Through Law
Republican liberty, or nondomination, is not freedom from law but rather freedom
through law.179 Some have construed nondomination as a kind of negative liberty,
emphasizing that it is freedom from domination in the same way that noninterference
is freedom from interference.180 But even if this is so, it might well be where the
172

See LOVETT, REPUBLIC OF LAW, supra note 119, at 115.
Gwilym David Blunt, On the Source, Site and Modes of Domination, 8 J. POL. POWER
3–4 (2015), https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/20216/ [https://perma.cc/J8JK-XWS7];
see TENBROEK, supra note 34, at 149.
174
ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 13
(1982) (emphasis omitted).
175
Id. at 1.
176
See LOVETT, DOMINATION AND JUSTICE, supra note 153, at 3 (“[T]he Romans came
to understand domination generally as the opposite of freedom—a free person (liber) was
someone not subject to the domination (dominatio) of another, and vice versa.”); see also
HADFIELD, supra note 157, at 146–47 (“[In The Rape of Lucrece,] Tarquin has overridden
the Roman rule of law and introduced the condition of slavery, reducing his subjects to this
lowest of all human conditions[.] The republican political vision of free citizens making free
choices . . . stands as a laudable ideal in contrast. Liberty and slavery are incompatible states.”);
PATTERSON, supra note 174, at 27–34 (discussing the Roman conception of slavery among
other peoples’ conceptions not oriented around the liberty-slavery dichotomy); PETTIT, ON
THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 5–8; PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 151, at 31–35.
177
See BAILYN, supra note 139, at 235, 232–46 (describing how the gap between the
liberty that framers’ sought for themselves but denied to those whom they enslaved “became
too glaring to be ignored” and how the convergence of Black liberation and the colonies’ independence became “inescapable”).
178
Rogers, Race, Domination, and Republicanism, supra note 156, at 79.
179
See PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 151, at 35–41.
180
E.g., Ian Shapiro, On Non-Domination, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 293, 307 (2012).
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similarities end. Whereas noninterference is agnostic as to political system, as mentioned above,181 nondomination is integral to republican government, and it is
through law that nondomination comes into being.182 “[F]ar from abrogating freedom,
public interference—exercised under democratic control—in fact constitutes freedom
as distinct from causing it, because it secures citizens against private domination.”183
Although “nondomination” is newer to the lexicon, this conception of freedom
through law has a rich history in our legal tradition, often contrasted with slavery,
arbitrariness, or improper dependence.184 As mentioned above, the classical paradigm of domination was the enslaver-enslaved relationship. Algernon Sidney, whose
Discourses Concerning Government greatly influenced our framers,185 wrote:
The weight of Chains, number of Stripes, hardness of labour, and
other effects of a Master’s cruelty, may make one servitude more
miserable than another: but he is a slave who serves the best and
181

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See JAMES HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE COMMONWEALTH OF
OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 1, 20 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1992) (distinguishing freedom
from law and freedom by law); HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 12 (“Harrington is making
both an adversarial point . . . and a deeper one: that it is by the laws that we are free. Our
freedom is created and maintained through the law.”).
183
See Eoin Daly, Freedom as Non-Domination in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Rights,
28 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 289, 291 (2015) [hereinafter Daly, Freedom as Non-Domination
in Jurisprudence] (citing Philip Pettit, Law and Liberty, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note
154); see also Johann N. Neem, Developing Freedom: Thomas Jefferson, the State, and Human
Capability, 27 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 36, 38 (2013) [hereinafter Neem, Developing Freedom]
(“Jefferson believed that to enjoy the freedoms that rights protected required constant government intervention in society and the economy. Otherwise, economic, political, and religious
liberty would be empty promises.”).
184
E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 132 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1979) (1765) (“[L]aws,
when prudently framed, are by no means subversive but rather introductive of liberty; for . . .
where there is no law, there is no freedom.”); BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT
ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 29–70
(2001) (discussing Robert Hale’s critique of market coercion and the role of law in freeing individuals from abuses of private power, even if liberty had value only “as a rhetorical stand-in
for material wealth”); PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 70–71 (2016);
GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG, supra note 119, at 8–10 (discussing John Joachim
Zubly’s 1775 sermon, “The Law of Liberty”); HALE, supra note 110, at 381 (“Legislation
which alters the relative economic powers of different classes in the community may often be
accurately characterized as protecting the liberty, or property, or equality of some individuals
against the actions of others.”); John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 277, 280–81 (1986) (providing examples, like the Sherman Act, Robert’s Rules of
Order, and traffic laws, of regulations that expand rather than contract liberty).
185
See CAROLINE ROBBINS, Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government:
Textbook of Revolution, in ROBBINS, supra note 139, at 267–91.
182
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gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the worst;
and he does serve him if he must obey his commands, and depends upon his will.186
Within Sidney’s abstract invocation of slavery, unfreedom is subjection to another’s
will, the focus of Commonwealthmen and Dissenter critiques. Richard Price, for
example, wrote that “[i]ndividuals in private life, while held under the power of
masters, cannot be denominated free, however equitably and kindly they may be
treated.”187 The problem is that powerful individuals or entities, when insufficiently
regulated, can deny us opportunities to act, and the potential for this denial is enough
to make us unfree.188 The influential founders of the eighteenth-century journal Le
Républicain, including Sophie de Grouchy, Nicolas de Condorcet, and Thomas Paine,
shared this critique. “To be free [was] not . . . merely to be free of interference—as
the subject of a benign monarch might be—but to be free of the potential interference of one who has absolute power over us and may choose to exert it at any point
in time.”189 A benign monarch will die, and her heir might not be benign.190
Moreover, insufficient democratic control enables would-be dominators to create
relationships of improper dependence.191 Price’s colleague Joseph Priestley noted
that “by the same power, by which the people of England can compel [the Americans]
to pay one penny, they may compel them to pay the last penny they have.”192 In his
186

ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT III.21, at 349–50 (Thomas
G. West ed., 1996) (1698).
187
RICHARD PRICE, Additional Observations on Nature and Value of Civil Liberty, and
the War with America, in RICHARD PRICE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 76, 77 (D.O. Thomas ed., 1991);
cf. Alan Coffee, Mary Wollstonecraft, Public Reason, and the Virtuous Republic, in THE
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT 183, 185 (Sandrine Bergès
& Alan Coffee eds., 2016) (“A distinguishing feature of the classical or Commonwealthman
conception of freedom, upon which Wollstonecraft drew, is that two forms of freedom are
always invoked simultaneously, the free man and the free state.”).
188
See PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 58–59 (construing invocations
of “arbitrariness” as uncontrolled capacity for interference rather than as unpredictability); see
also Tom O’Shea, Disability and Domination: Lessons from Republican Political Philosophy,
35 J. APPLIED PHIL. 133, 139 (2018) (underscoring that nondomination is not only opportunity
to act but also “freedom as a social status”).
189
Sandrine Bergès, Sophie de Grouchy on the Cost of Domination in the Letters on
Sympathy and Two Anonymous Articles in LE RÉPUBLICAIN, 98 MONIST 102, 103 (2015).
190
Id. Moreover, “as Paine and Condorcet both point[ed] out, a people who know that
their children will not be free cannot call themselves free.” Id.
191
E.g., MERCY OTIS WARREN, 83: To John Adams, December 1786, in WARREN:
SELECTED LETTERS, supra note 152, at 210, 212 (“Dependence is a word not very pleasing
to an American ear: but though we have broken the yoke of Britain, and defied the potentates
of the earth, we cannot expunge it from our vocabulary.”).
192
JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, The Present State of Liberty, in JOSEPH PRIESTLEY: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 129, 140 (Peter N. Miller ed., 1993).
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widely read pamphlet, Common Sense, Paine too identified freedom as independence.193 The authors of our Declaration of Independence in turn complained not just
of the British crown’s vindictiveness, but more fundamentally of insufficient control,
“a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object[:] . . . to
reduce them under absolute Despotism.”194
It is important to distinguish domination from how we understand dependence
today. Dependence is an inescapable part of the human condition, including “[t]he
immaturity of infancy and early childhood, illness and disability that render[] one
nonfunctional even in the most accommodating surroundings, and the fragility of
advanced old age . . . .”195 And although power inequalities are endemic to relationships of care and dependence, “not every such inequality amounts to domination.”196
At the same time, the experiences of disability, love, child-rearing, elder care, and
medicine remind us that law does not inevitably create freedom; nondomination exists
insofar as law constrains the use of power against people’s avowed interests.197
2. Nondomination as Materialist Freedom
Nondomination also “presupposes the resources required to make it effective.”198 This presumption—that social, economic, and political circumstances shape
how we experience freedom—reflects a materialism derived from Renaissance
thought and kept alive by later republican thinkers.199 For Mary Wollstonecraft, for
193

See THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS 5, 43
(Eric Foner ed., 1995) (arguing that, unless America’s “seat of government” is occupied independent of the British Empire, “we shall be in danger of having it filled by some fortunate
ruffian . . . and then, where will be our freedom?”).
194
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776) (emphases added).
195
EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 29 (1999); cf. O’Shea, supra note 188, at 133–34; Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
1, 8–15 (2008).
196
KITTAY, supra note 195, at 34; accord Christopher McCammon, Domination: A
Rethinking, 125 ETHICS 1028, 1031 n.13 (2015).
197
See, e.g., PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 58–59; O’Shea, supra
note 188, at 135–36, 144.
198
PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 153, at 103 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 204–05 (1971)) (contrasting republicanism with Rawlsian justice, “under which
people’s equal freedom, as prescribed in [Rawls’s] first principle, does not require them to
have the resources needed to exercise and value that freedom”); cf. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 131 (1997) [hereinafter
BLACK, NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM] (“‘Liberty’ is pervasively deadened by poverty into a
dumb simulacrum, clean-shorn of ‘the blessings of liberty.’”).
199
See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 140, at 70 (describing ideological and linguistic similarities
across Machiavelli’s Discourses, book I, chapter 3; Madison’s The Federalist No. 51; and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s 1897 speech, “The Path of the Law”); cf. ATHANASIOS MOULAKIS,
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example, “the situation of [eighteenth-century British] women—in private and in
public life—illustrated perfectly what a denial of personal freedom is and what it
does to a person’s mind and life.”200 Material inequalities and economic relationships centered around the decisions of propertied White men constrained the choices
of “constitutional outsiders” like women, Black people, and Native Americans.201
Our framers too understood how material circumstances influence choice,
especially at the polls, though many advocated for restricting suffrage rather than
improving would-be voters’ circumstances.202 Gouverneur Morris, for example,
argued that those who were not educated and propertied should not vote, because
they were like children; they “could not consent,” and “their consent was in fact
irrelevant, since they [had] no will of their own.”203 John Adams, Thomas Jefferson,
and others also linked the exercise of independent judgment to material circumstances, uncharitably extending the children analogy to low-income men, women,
enslaved Americans, and colonized Native peoples.204 Jefferson’s general materialism
could have led him to advocate for improved circumstances for all, but he infamously (and illogically) attributed African Americans’ more limited educational
opportunity at the time to innate rather than circumstantial difference.205
REPUBLICAN REALISM IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE: FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI’S DISCORSO
DI LOGROGNO 41–67 (1998) (describing social, economic, and political changes that influenced
“realist” Florentine thinkers); POCOCK, supra note 138, at 208 (describing Machiavelli’s
view that corruption and loss of liberty arise from social conditions and inequality).
200
Lena Halldenius, Mary Wollstonecraft and Freedom as Independence, in WOMEN AND
LIBERTY, 1600–1800: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 95, 99 (Jacqueline Broad & Karen Detlefsen
eds., 2017) (emphases added); cf. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A Room of One’s Own, in A ROOM OF
ONE’S OWN AND THREE GUINEAS 1, 81–86 (Anna Snaith ed., 2015); cf. Jurgen De Wispelaere
& David Casassas, A Life of One’s Own: Republican Freedom and Disability, 29 DISABILITY
& SOC’Y 402, 406–08 (2014) (describing the disadvantages that disabled individuals experience
and their effects on republican freedom).
201
See GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY,
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S 60–71 (2019);
see also HALLDENIUS, MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 24, at 28 (“Republican liberty . . . is
institution-dependent.”).
202
See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 54–65 (2000) (describing late eighteenth and early nineteenth century restrictions on the right to vote grounded in beliefs about the insufficient
independence of women, Black people, Native Americans, and low-income men).
203
HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 42–43 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
204
Id. at 43, 356; CLAUDIO SAUNT, UNWORTHY REPUBLIC: THE DISPOSSESSION OF NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE ROAD TO INDIAN TERRITORY 267–68 (2020).
205
Neem, Developing Freedom, supra note 183, at 46; see id. at 44–45. For trenchant critiques of—and appeals against—Jefferson’s misattribution, see DAVID WALKER, APPEAL TO
THE COLOURED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD 12–18, 27–30 (Peter P. Hinks ed., 2000); Rogers,
David Walker, supra note 157, at 61–62, 69.
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But beyond giving rise to cynicism or regressive views, materialism more productively undergirded fears of power, corruption, and domination, whether by an
entrenched few of an ineffectual many or by a capricious many of a vulnerable few.206
James Madison, for example, argued for sufficient democratic controls on grounds
that humans are hardly angels.207 Madison wrote:
[Even] a minority may in an appeal to force, be an overmatch for
the majority[:] 1. if the minority happen to include all such as
possess the skill and habits of military life, [and] such as possess
the great pecuniary resources, one-third only may conquer the
remaining two-thirds[;] 2. one-third of those who [vote] may be
rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty
excludes them from a right of suffrage . . . [; and] 3. where slavery
exists the republican [t]heory becomes still more fallacious.208
In other words, a republic cannot (and does not) exist where a wealthy few with
control over military force can oppress the many; the many lack the resources and
capacities to vote, or could even be bought off by the few; or the many include those
enslaved by the few. Even Alexander Hamilton recognized the threat of economic
domination, writing that “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power
over his will.”209 This materialism carries through to current accounts of domination,
recognizing the need for certain social goods and institutions in curbing its effects.210
Moreover, it underscores how domination can vary both in source—not only individual
206

See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 139, at 330; PAINE, supra note 193, at 43–44 (discussing
the danger of “undue authority” among a small number of representatives); TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 143, at 289–90 (interpreting the framers’ theory of corruption
as in part the use of public power to advance private interests); see also POCOCK, supra note
138, at 93 (discussing fifteenth-century Florentine Giovanni Cavalcanti’s theory of corruption
as the replacement of public governance by private governance); VERGARA, supra note 155, at
39 (theorizing systemic corruption as “the gradual decay of ‘representativeness’ and the increasing oligarchization of government and society within a general respect for the rule of law”).
207
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); cf. ROBINSON JEFFERS, Shine, Perishing
Republic, in THE SELECTED POETRY OF ROBINSON JEFFERS 23, 23 (Tim Hunt ed., 2001) (“[B]e
in nothing so moderate as in love of man, a clever servant, insufferable master.”).
208
James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (May 7, 1787), The
James Madison Papers at the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm012727/
[https://perma.cc/HGB6-8EYR].
209
THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
210
E.g., PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 153, at xix (citing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006); Philip Pettit, A Definition of Physicalism, 53 ANALYSIS 213 (1993);
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985)); see also IRIS MARION YOUNG,
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 66–95 (1990) (describing, among other things,
how a consumerist society and a bureaucratic state supporting it can facilitate domination).
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agents but also plural agents and institutions211—and in degree—depending on the
power differential between source and subject.212
3. Nondomination as Freedom Among Equals
Finally, for now, nondomination presumes the equal status of all people who
live within the would-be republic, a point that has been at the heart of our struggles
to make good on republican freedom. As Cicero said: “Nothing can be sweeter than
liberty. Yet if it isn’t equal throughout, it isn’t liberty at all.”213
Our framers’ asserted republicanism reflected fundamental contradictions and
failings, most obviously the perpetuation of chattel slavery and the decimation of
Native nations and expropriation of their land. Privately, even some framers who
enslaved others acknowledged that chattel slavery more truly epitomized unfreedom
than their own ties to the British Empire.214 Publicly, however, Americans could not
reconcile their asserted republican values with the United States’ racial hierarchy.215
Norms of settler empire took freedom “as an exclusivist ideal, accessible only to
211

Blunt, supra note 173, at 5; see RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION, supra
note 158, at 81–86 (describing Progressive Era critiques, like Louis Brandeis’s, of agent-based
as well as structural domination); Victoria Costa, Freedom as Non-Domination and Civic
Education: Legalistic or Virtue Centered?, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL AND
CIVIC EDUCATION: SHAPING CITIZENS AND THEIR SCHOOLS 156, 163–68 (Christine Tappolet
& Colin Macleod eds., 2019) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL AND
CIVIC EDUCATION] (arguing that widespread prejudice hinders freedom, even if more a
device of domination than an instance of domination); Rogers, David Walker, supra note
157, at 74 (“Racial domination limits us even where there is no obvious person acting in the
role of a master.”).
212
McCammon, supra note 196, at 1041–43, 1046–47; see HAMILTON, supra note 155,
at 81–82, 88–90.
213
PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 88 (quoting CICERO, THE REPUBLIC
AND THE LAWS 21 (Niall Rudd trans., 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Elizabeth
Anderson, Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective, 117 ETHICS 595,
615 (2007) [hereinafter Anderson, Fair Opportunity] (“[Democratic] [e]quality refers fundamentally to an ideal of social relations, in which people from all walks of life enjoy equal dignity,
interact with one another on terms of equality and respect, and are not vulnerable to oppression
by others.”); Atiba R. Ellis, Reviving the Dream: Equality and the Democratic Promise in the
Post–Civil Rights Era, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 789, 799 (2014) (linking all persons’ equal
status to democratic rule); Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16,
1963), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/sites/mlk/files/letterfrombirmingham_wwcw_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQ8F-SK7J] (“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”).
214
ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 33 (1998) [hereinafter FONER,
AMERICAN FREEDOM]. Thomas Jefferson, for example, conceded that “one hour of [chattel
slavery] is fraught with more misery than ages of [dependence on the British Empire] which
he rose in rebellion to oppose.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, Answers and Observations for
Démeunier’s Article on the United States in the Encyclopédie Methodique, 1786, in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 575, 592 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 2011).
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See SAUNT, supra note 204, at 80.
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Anglo-Saxons and select Europeans,” where “exclusivism presupposed that settler
security . . . required the subordination of internal and external enemies . . . .”216
Students of the Supreme Court can readily spot domination overshadowing liberty
for all in decisions restricting who counts as citizens,217 who can vote,218 who deserves
equal opportunity,219 and whose privacy and bodily autonomy matter,220 among others.
Facing down contradictions “too obvious to ignore,” American social movements began
to ask “whether and how republican liberty might be universalized,”221 imagining
“a republicanism that was both inclusive and disconnected from territorial conquest.”222
216

RANA, supra note 156, at 97; see ADAM DAHL, EMPIRE OF THE PEOPLE: SETTLER
COLONIALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 17 (2018)
(“Despite the central principles of equality at the center of this new notion of empire, the
[Northwest Ordinance of 1787] allowed for the further dispossession of indigenous communities as a necessary feature of republican expansionism.”); Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian
Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1800 (2019) (“The word
‘slavery,’ like the word ‘colonialism,’ appears nowhere in the Constitution. Yet, like America’s
other original sin, traces of America’s history with colonialism are woven in like threads to
the fabric of the document.” (citing FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Meaning of July Fourth for the
Negro (July 5, 1852), in FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 188,
204 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1999))); Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Historical Background,
in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE 2, 19–32 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie et al. eds.,
2015) (recounting the subversion and overthrow in 1893 of Hawai‘i’s government by lawyers
and businessmen supported by American troops and the United States’ annexation of the
inaptly called “Republic of Hawai‘i” that they set up in its place); William Wood, It Wasn’t
an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1623–31 (2013)
(recounting the history of states’ encroachment into Indian Country and assertions of jurisdiction there, culminating in the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and Supreme Court cases like Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832)).
217
See generally, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); cf. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
564–66 (1903) (contending that American Indians were entirely under Congress’s plenary
power and had no treaty rights that Congress was bound to respect).
218
See generally, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 221–25 (1898) (contending
that literacy tests and poll taxes that disenfranchised African American voters did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
219
See generally, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (contending that Illinois law
barring women from practicing law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
220
See generally, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v.
United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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See Frank Lovett, The Labour Republicans and the Classical Republican Tradition:
Alex Gourevitch’s From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 17 EUR. J. POL. THEORY
244, 245 (2018).
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Black republicans and abolitionists bore early witness to the nation’s failure to
secure true nondomination. In the 1830s, for example, abolitionist and minister
Hosea Easton “illustrate[d] the state of a people with a good government and laws,
and with a disposition to explain away all their meaning.”223 Through chattel slavery,
directly at odds with nondomination, Anglo-American elites could “carry out their
[asserted] republicanism into the most fatal despotism.”224 David Walker too, like
Cicero, insisted that republican liberty pertained to all people, without “distinction.”225
“Can there be a greater absurdity,” he asked, than domination based on differences
arising in nature, “and particularly in a free republican country?”226 And although
some abolitionists resisted comparing chattel slavery with “wage slavery” and other
labor exploitation,227 others saw intersecting struggles as illuminating how nondomination must reach everyone.228 Maria Stewart, for example, explicitly linked the
nominally free servant and hard labor systems of the northern United States with
“southern slavery,” acknowledging the difference but admonishing her audience that
“continual hard labor deadens the energies of the soul, and benumbs the faculties of
the mind,” that the legal line between the enslavement and emancipation of Black
people was not always the lived line.229
The American labor movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
also reconfigured the framers’ reliance on “political slavery” as republicanism’s
paradigm.230 Labor republicans like Thomas Skidmore, Orestes Brownson, and
Langdon Byllesby shared Black republicans’ assessments that freedom is universalizable.231 Skidmore argued, in fact, “that rather than being political enemies,
poor whites shared fundamental interests with black slaves and dispossessed Indians,
223

HOSEA EASTON, A Treatise on the Intellectual Character, and the Civil and Political
Condition of the Colored People of the United States; and the Prejudice Exercised Towards
Them, in TO HEAL THE SCOURGE OF PREJUDICE: THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HOSEA EASTON
63, 91 (George R. Price & James Brewer Stewart eds., 1999) (1837) (emphasis added); see
generally Rogers, Race, Domination, and Republicanism, supra note 156, at 59–76, 79–83
(discussing the republican thought of David Walker, Hosea Easton, Martin Delany, and
Frederick Douglass).
224
EASTON, supra note 223, at 92.
225
See WALKER, supra note 205, at 43–45.
226
See id. at 45.
227
See GOUREVITCH, supra note 156, at 41–46.
228
E.g., WALKER, supra note 205, at 31–32; Maria Stewart, Lecture Delivered at the
Franklin Hall, in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 30, 30–33 (Beverly Guy-Sheftall ed., 2011) [hereinafter WORDS OF FIRE].
229
Stewart, supra note 228, at 30–32; cf. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST
THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 27 (2d ed.,
2000) (identifying Stewart’s perspective on intersecting struggles as a core theme advanced
by some Black feminist intellectual traditions).
230
See GOUREVITCH, supra note 156, at 8–9.
231
See RANA, supra note 156, at 153–62.
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as each group was confined by existing economic hierarchies to poverty and dependence.”232 In their analyses, labor republicans drew from earlier thinkers like Paine
and William Manning, who paid particular attention to the ways in which the “few”
use their wealth to keep the “many” in subservience.233 As “industrial wage labor
became more commonplace,” replacing artisanal production, so too did “increasingly entrenched oppressive work relations.”234
To be sure, groups experiencing domination did not always work together,
perhaps keeping their causes separate for strategic reasons, perhaps not at first
perceiving their commonality, or perhaps wedged apart by elites seeking to shore
up their power.235 Yet these social movements’ advocacy laid bare both the materialist and egalitarian presumptions of freedom as nondomination, universalizing the
republican polity and overcoming the stale enslaver-enslaved dichotomy to critique
other, layered forms of exploitation.236 Because these Americans “fought such a
vigorous and intellectually productive battle over the relationship between slavery
232

See id. at 159.
See, e.g., BREWER, supra note 203, at 366; GOUREVITCH, supra note 156, at 73.
234
RANA, supra note 156, at 148; accord ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT, supra note
158, at 35 (discussing the nineteenth-century rise of “free labor” and “wage slavery” ideologies);
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION, supra note 158, at 64–68.
235
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 20–26 (2010) (recounting the planter class’s development of the
“racial bribe” as a way to “drive a wedge” between Black people and low-income White people);
FONER, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 214, at 58–68 (describing nineteenth-century contestation between “free labor” and “wage slavery” ideologies and abolitionist goals); ANDRÉS
RESÉNDEZ, THE OTHER SLAVERY: THE UNCOVERED STORY OF INDIAN ENSLAVEMENT IN
AMERICA 296 (2016) (observing that nineteenth-century Americans tended to see different
groups, like Black people and American Indians, as “afflicted by different problems,” despite
“common threads of labor oppression”); cf. Salvador E. Pérez, Section 2 Zero-Sums: How
the Supreme Court Misconstrued the Voting Rights Act, Limits Minority Representation, and
Dangerously Pits Minorities Against Each Other, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111, 113, 117–18,
120 (2015) (describing intergroup competition caused by decisions under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act that require one minority group alone, rather than in coalition with others,
to comprise more than fifty-percent citizen voting age population (CVAP) of a possible remedial
district in order to prove vote dilution).
236
See GOUREVITCH, supra note 156, at 109; see also DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY
BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO
WORLD WAR II 155–232, 310–23 (2008) (describing Jim Crow debt peonage and convict leasing
systems); CAREY MCWILLIAMS, FACTORIES IN THE FIELD: THE STORY OF MIGRATORY FARM
LABOR IN CALIFORNIA 3–10, 103–33, 196–99 (1939) (describing California farm industrialists’
“easy business of exploiting competing racial groups” through ruthless labor practices); MAE
M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
56–90 (2004) (describing how deportation policy created and enabled the exploitation of
undocumented Americans by agribusiness and other industries); RESÉNDEZ, supra note 235,
at 10 (“[A]fter the Spanish crown prohibited the enslavement of Indians, owners resorted to
a variety of labor arrangements, terms, and subterfuges—such as encomiendas, repartimientos,
convict leasing, and debt peonage—to get around the law.”).
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and freedom,” they began to understand, and to resolve, the “paradoxes” of the
framers’ asserted republicanism.237 In doing so, they also began to change who
counted as the nation’s “paradigmatic legal individuals.”238
***
The view of nondomination that I have presented in this Part—universal, materialist
freedom through law—is the core of republicanism and thus of the republican
guarantee. This view, under which the guarantee imposes an antidomination duty
on the federal government, derives its contours largely from the recent instrumental
turn in republican thought.239 That turn has drawn attention off of a litany of governance norms and onto the experience of domination, in particular its experience by
those not historically counted as citizens.240 The value of a nondomination guarantee
need not depend on its having been always understood in this way.241 Nondomination
is, after all, republicanism’s organizing principle; it is what makes republicanism
make sense.
Yet I have tried to show how freedom as nondomination fits into our constitutional tradition nonetheless. A “strong strand of antislavery constitutionalism”
emerged in the years between the nation’s founding and refounding, challenging
established views of what it means to become a republic.242 Black, feminist, and labor
republicans, among others, posited that their perspectives be placed on equal footing
with those perspectives that had always been prioritized, and they struggled to make
it so.243 Thus, there are resonances between a nondomination-oriented republican
guarantee and what Paul Gowder has called “liberation constitutionalism”244 as well
as readings of the Reconstruction Amendments as serving anti-“group-disadvantaging,” antisubordination, or even antisubjugation purposes.245 In the next Part, I turn
237

GOUREVITCH, supra note 156, at 8.
See LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS 124 (2015).
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See Dawood, Antidomination Model, supra note 159, at 1429–33.
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See id. at 1432–33.
241
Cf. Eavan Boland, Eviction, NEW YORKER (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2020/05/04/eviction [https://perma.cc/S9AR-BQQA] (delineating the limits
of history).
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EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 68.
243
See id. at 124 (discussing restrictions imposed on women and racial minorities in free
soil states).
244
See Paul Gowder, Big 10 Law School Speaker Series: Liberation Constitutionalism,
IND. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Apr. 6, 2021), https://iu.mediaspace.kaltura.com/media/t/1_8b7ylx
25 [https://perma.cc/EZN4-YF7M] (proffering a constitutional theory rooted in Black intellectual traditions that is reconstructive, inclusive, and ongoing); see generally Paul Gowder,
Reconstituting We the People: Frederick Douglass and Jürgen Habermas in Conversation,
114 NW. U. L. REV. 335 (2019).
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Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107,
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to education’s essential role in achieving nondomination and bring into focus the
challenge at the republican guarantee’s core.
III. A NEW BIRTH OF EDUCATION
Education, “the main effect” of which is “the achieving of a life of rich significance,” is a powerful mechanism for antidomination.246 And in a would-be republic,
it is not only powerful but necessary. In this Part, I continue to focus on the republican guarantee as a nondomination guarantee, and I describe education’s indispensable role in minimizing domination. But I also underscore the genuine challenge in
understanding the republican guarantee this way: the guarantee, by imposing an
antidomination duty on the federal government, is an ongoing constitutional obligation. It is this conceptual challenge that has motivated our smaller, more superficial
concerns with courts answering “political” questions or lacking expertise to adjudicate education cases. And it is to this challenge that, in closing, I propose a few
responses and paths forward.
A. Education as Antidomination
On countless occasions, lawmakers and educators have declared that a republic
will not exist where there is anything less than good education.247 Indeed, this was
the central perspective of Horace Mann, a leader in the nineteenth-century common
schools movement, and other reformers.248 Mann tended to characterize republican
government as a fantastical beast that must be tamed, arguing that unless we cultivate
108 (1976); see Evan D. Bernick, Antisubjugation and the Equal Protection of the Laws,
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2021); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007–10 (1986).
246
See DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 277. Even “education
skeptic[s]” acknowledge that the nineteenth-century common schools movement’s creation
of a public education system where none existed before represented a great success in educating outside of a narrow elite. See DAVID F. LABAREE, SOMEONE HAS TO FAIL: THE ZERO-SUM
GAME OF PUBLIC SCHOOLING 245 (2010); see also id. at 42–79, 243.
247
See, e.g., HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 76–90 (1849) (“[T]he necessity of
general intelligence, under a republican form of government, like most other very important
truths, has become a very trite one.”); BOB PEPPERMAN TAYLOR, HORACE MANN’S TROUBLING
LEGACY: THE EDUCATION OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS 25–37 (2010) [hereinafter TAYLOR,
HORACE MANN’S TROUBLING LEGACY]; JAMES WILSON, Of the Judicial Department, in 2
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 109, at 101–02 (“Among the ancients, those who studied
and practised the sciences of jurisprudence and government with the greatest success, were
convinced . . . that the fate of states depends on the education of youth.”); WOOD, supra note
139, at 426–27.
248
See, e.g., CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780–1860, 3–12 (1983); JOHANN N. NEEM, DEMOCRACY’S SCHOOLS:
THE RISE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN AMERICA 5–30 (2017).
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our “new and unheard-of powers” of democracy, “we shall perish by the very instruments prepared for our happiness.”249 Scholars ever since have agreed on education’s
unavoidable import for self-government. Public schools “play an integral role in the
nation-building process” and “in socializing children for work and citizenship.”250
At the same time, their purpose is greater than “preparing . . . youth to govern,”
encompassing also the development of capabilities and “intellectual tools” for
pursuing individual and collective happiness.251
But education’s role as a dynamo of nondomination remains underdiscussed.
Therefore, I do not belabor broader discussions of the values of education, focusing
instead on two important kinds of domination costs—psychological and material—and
the need for education in negating them or, better, preventing them. Psychological
costs include insufficient understanding of and fellowship with co-citizens as well as
a kind of nihilism regarding democracy as “a way of life.”252 Material costs include
undeveloped capabilities for effectuating individual goals and democratic participation, specifically in order to resist domination by the state and by private individuals
or corporations.253 Just because education is necessary does not, of course, mean that
it is sufficient.254 But although institutions other than schools have roles in minimizing domination,255 no other government bodies equip us to the same degree with
249

HORACE MANN, The Necessity of Education in a Republican Government, in 2 LIFE

AND WORKS OF HORACE MANN 143, 151 (Mary Mann ed., 1867); see HORACE MANN, EIGHTH

ANNUAL REPORT 99 (1845) (“[T]he summit of social happiness can never be reached except
under republican constitutions; and no chimera more absurd ever entered the brain of the wildest
dreamer, than that republican constitutions can long exist without intelligence and morality.”).
250
Rachel F. Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making Grutter Matter in School Desegregation
Cases, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 502–03 (2009) [hereinafter Moran, Let Freedom Ring].
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Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public
Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 90 (2011) [hereinafter Imoukhuede, Fifth Freedom]; accord Neem, Developing Freedom, supra note 183, at 37, 44–45 (describing Jefferson’s
belief that education is instrumental to the pursuit of happiness).
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See JOHN DEWEY, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE
LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 224–26 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988) [hereinafter DEWEY,
Creative Democracy].
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See HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 64 (“[T]he aims of education are . . . related to the
development of those human powers that enable agents to exercise their freedoms and to
resist potential and actual invasions of liberty.”).
254
See LABAREE, supra note 246, at 246–47, 250–51; Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of
Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078,
1116–17 (1989) (noting the agreement that schools “are not the only parties responsible” for
widespread educational failures and acknowledging that “schools cannot and should not be
expected to be guarantors of success,” given life’s complexity and unpredictability).
255
See, e.g., ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT, supra note 158, at 65–71 (discussing
reforms that might make workplaces more accountable to their workers); Dawood, Antidomination Model, supra note 159, at 1478–82 (discussing “elements of current court doctrine and
practice” that reflect an antidomination approach in election law).
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intellectual tools for resisting domination. Insofar as the republican guarantee is
concerned, education is fundamental to nondomination, and we therefore have fundamental rights to it.
After discussing the costs of domination that are negated by excellent, equitable
public education, I briefly discuss antidomination’s relationship to calls for civic virtue
or virtuous citizenship, and to the long-standing equity-adequacy debate. Whereas
education as antidomination might create civic virtue, that is not its primary purpose.
And whereas the principle of nondomination demands more than either equity or
adequacy, the convergence of equity and adequacy in theory and in school reform
litigation seems itself to converge on nondomination’s more forceful demands.
1. Negating Domination’s Psychological Costs
Freedom, as John Dewey argued, “designates a mental attitude rather than external unconstraint of movements, but . . . this quality of mind cannot develop
without a fair leeway of movements in exploration, experimentation, application,
etc.”256 Education and schools, therefore, can have a profound effect on our psychological experience of freedom.
Domination’s psychological costs include the misperception of character,
whether seeing fellowship where there is none or not seeing fellowship where it is.
In her Letters on Sympathy, de Grouchy saw this “as a sort of immaturity, an inability to judge for oneself what is right and what is just, a tendency to look to one’s
superior always,” even “to childishly attach to one’s oppressor.”257 We begin life “in
a particular dependence on many others.”258 Through these relationships, we see that
“when we suffer, others can relieve our pain,” and our first lesson is “not how to
look after ourselves but, rather, how to be dependent on one another.”259 But without
“reflection,” bearing witness to others’ experiences, and “exercis[ing] [our] sensitivity
to the point where it will continue to develop as much as it is capable,” we will not
gain the requisite sympathy to distinguish dependence from domination.260 “Sympathy is the disposition we have to feel in a way similar to others.”261 It is not mere
civility or toleration but rather understanding one another as equals, what we might
256

DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 357.
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also call “mutual empathy” or “mutual respect.”262 Domination, meanwhile, diminishes our capabilities “to look upon each other as equals.”263
In his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, Walker demonstrated these
psychological costs at work. Analyzing an 1829 news report about roughly sixty
enslaved African-American men and women rebelling against slavers transporting
them, Walker focused on the tragic decision of one of the enslaved women to help
a slaver to escape.264 To Walker, the woman’s story was tragic and all too common:
hearing any whisper of “the melioration of their dreadful condition, they run and tell
tyrants, that they may be enabled to keep them the longer in wretchedness and
miseries.”265 In this instance, the woman’s domination inhibited her full perception
of her own and others’ interests, needs, and motivations. “[B]ound by an expectation
she [did] not see and therefore bound by a betrayal she [did] not acknowledge,” the
woman became “a coparticipant in her own domination and in the domination of
others without recognizing it.”266 Because hardship activates our survival instincts,
we more readily turn on each other, as if competitors for scarce resources, and
further enable elite domination.267
The psychological costs of domination affect not only those without power but also
those in power, albeit with different results.268 Republican thinkers have long considered the role of ambition; while the state should encourage skilled and energetic citizens to pursue public service, excessive ambition leads to elites’ political or economic
262

See LABORDE, supra note 154, at 178; Martha Minow, Just Education: An Essay for
Frank Michelman, 39 TULSA L. REV. 547, 556 (2004); Blain Neufeld, Non-Domination and
Political Liberal Citizenship Education, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL AND
CIVIC EDUCATION, supra note 211, at 135, 137; see also JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND
SOCIETY 28–29 (1900); TAYLOR, HORACE MANN’S TROUBLING LEGACY, supra note 247, at
118 (citing Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557, 557–79
(1995)); id. at 121 (citing KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM 85 (2006)). For
an argument that “preventing domination requires moral education in the practice and value
of care,” which I understand as even more demanding than sympathy, mutual empathy, or
mutual respect, see Shawn Fraistat, Domination and Care in Rousseau’s Emile, 110 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 889, 889 (2016) (emphasis added).
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Sandrine Bergès & Eric Schliesser, Introduction to DE GROUCHY, LETTERS ON SYMPATHY,
supra note 258, at 43; cf. Bergès, supra note 189, at 110 (“[E]xtreme inequality leads distant
social classes no longer to regard each other as part of the same humanity.”).
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WALKER, supra note 205, at 25–28. The slaver, Walker noted, returned with reinforcements and reenslaved those who had rebelled. Id. at 26.
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Id. at 28.
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Rogers, David Walker, supra note 157, at 71.
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See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 235, at 20–26; BLACK, SCHOOLHOUSE BURNING,
supra note 19, at 98 (explaining how Southern elites “objected to the symbolic message public
education would send” and how, if they were to concede that education is important, “the
normative lines separating poor, uneducated whites from [enslaved people] would thin,” as
would their “stranglehold on power”); id. at 111; SAUNT, supra note 204, at 243–44.
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See Fraistat, supra note 262, at 894.
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domination of the people.269 In Common Sense, Paine critiqued the habits that heritable
power inculcates in its wielder:
Men who look upon themselves born to reign, and others to obey,
soon grow insolent; . . . their minds are early poisoned by importance; and the world they act in differs so materially from the
world at large, that they have but little opportunity of knowing
its true interests, and when they succeed to the government are
frequently the most ignorant and unfit of any . . . .270
Over time, those doing the dominating come to see those they dominate as inferior
and thus deserving of further domination.271 But this can also lead elites to lose faith
in democratic practice, reinforcing beliefs that rules are meant to be bent, if not
broken.272 Thus, philosophers like Elizabeth Anderson have emphasized the importance of channeling striving citizens’ efforts into the productive and responsive
exercise of power.273 Education, especially of those who might become elites, must
cultivate: “awareness of the interests and problems of people from all sectors,” “a
disposition to serve those interests,” “technical knowledge of how to advance these
interests,” and “respectful interaction with people from all sectors.”274
Related to these psychological costs is yet another, manifesting in a kind of
democratic nihilism. Domination can make us feel powerless, especially to undertake political or social action, and “leads to a sense that the law does not matter.”275
Inculcating citizens’ equal dignity or standing is thus essential,276 especially where
elites have stigmatized groups by denying them opportunity on the basis of race,
269
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See DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 84–85; cf. Imoukhuede,
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See Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L.
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gender, class, etc.277 Equal standing “requires that each person have sufficient internal capacities and external resources” not only to resist domination but also “to
function as an equal in society—to fulfill a respected role in the division of labor,
participate in democratic discussion, appear in public without shame, and enjoy
equal moral standing to make claims on others.”278 Indeed, it was in part to deepen
their own sense of “autonomy and dignity,” alongside skills for resisting and escaping
from slavery, that many enslaved Black people worked hard to acquire literacy, often
in secret and at great risk.279 As Heather Williams has noted, “literacy had the potential to help enslaved people articulate intellectual objections to the very existence
of the institution of slavery.”280
In the end, domination is harmful psychologically because it “prevents people
from developing sympathy towards each other, and therefore from developing moral
judgment.”281 Sympathy “is a complex emotion that requires intellectual input and,
in turn, knowledge about people and the ways they suffer, as well as the ability to
think rapidly and abstractly about the complexity of human life.”282
As the first cause of this feeling of humanity, [sympathy’s] effects
are so precious that it can in part repair the suffering caused by
personal interest in large societies; it counters the power of might
that we encounter at each step and that centuries of enlightenment can only extinguish through the vices that produced it.283
Therefore, public education, through which we encounter and come to understand
fellow citizens whose experiences differ from ours, provides a uniquely powerful
277

See HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 74 (“Even if the process of education takes place
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corrective. “While some aspects of citizens’ competence (e.g., numeracy, literacy,
knowledge of history) can be achieved by individuals alone, other competencies
(e.g., mutual understanding, mutual respect, tolerance) are group achievements, best
accomplished through the presence of diverse individuals.”284
2. Negating Domination’s Material Costs
Whether in filing court claims or filling out mail-in ballots, cooking healthy
meals for family or applying for a promotion or a new job, education shapes our individual opportunities. On that ground alone, education would be “of prime importance to the happiness of the state.”285 Education further equips individuals with
capabilities necessary to resist domination. When we lack access to facts or those
facts have been suppressed, when we lack analytical skills to discern those facts’
import or to suspect their suppression, then we will not be able to see through the
scheming of well-heeled and ambitious politicians or tycoons.286 Indeed, nineteenthcentury labor republicans saw that the industrial system “not only stunted needs but
also produced ignorance and prejudice,” depriving workers of information and time
to read, “producing an ‘aristocracy of intellect’ appropriate to ‘monarchical governments[,]’ not republican ones.”287
Republican education must develop capabilities so as to reinforce all people’s
equal status, which nondomination presumes,288 or disarm threats to that equal status.
“Each student must receive an education of a certain level of quality if she or he is
to be able to exercise his or her constitutional rights and to have the real (not merely
theoretical) freedom to make choices about the direction of her or his life.”289
284

Debra Satz, Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship, 117 ETHICS 623, 637
(2007); see Moran, Let Freedom Ring, supra note 250, at 489 (“[T]he [Supreme Court’s] higher
education cases explored the collective implications of race. Producing knowledge and promoting democratic legitimacy required interaction among people from different backgrounds.”).
285
See JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nations, in 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note
109, at 146 (arguing that education is indispensable because it is a source of both public and
private happiness).
286
See HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 55 (“Learning does not merely consist of the mastery
of concepts and information: what we are looking for is the ability to make judgements.”); id. at
64; see also PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 153, at 191 (“In the most advanced democracies,
there is a host of special interest groups poised to impose their particular will on government
by recourse to backroom pressure, financial threat, fraudulent analysis, shameless misinformation, manufactured outrage, drummed-up hysteria . . . .”); Maria Stewart, Religion and the
Pure Principles of Morality, the Sure Foundation on Which We Must Build, in WORDS OF FIRE,
supra note 228, at 26, 27–28 (“Knowledge would begin to flow, and the chains of slavery
and ignorance would melt like wax before the flames.”).
287
GOUREVITCH, supra note 156, at 156 (citation omitted); cf. Stewart, supra note 228,
at 32.
288
See supra Section II.B.3.
289
Bowman, supra note 19, at 14 (citing AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987));
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Although education-as-antidomination is dynamic and does not amount simply to
equalization, either of resources or of outcomes, closing gaps is essential, given that
great inequalities invariably lead to domination.290 Moreover, limitations on our
opportunities to develop competencies can in turn feed domination’s psychological
costs. In his Appeal, for example, Walker also recounted his encounter with an AfricanAmerican man working as a bootblack who claimed to “‘never want to live any
better or happier than when [he] can get a plenty of boots and shoes to clean!!!’”291
Although Walker could not fault the man for shining shoes to eke out a living, he
lamented the man’s “glorying and being happy” in the mean self-worth and livelihood that others created for him and that he uncritically accepted.292
Turning our attention from resistive individual to contestatory society, our framers
and reframers considered public education functionally “critical to citizenship: it enables a republic.”293 “In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to
see BREWER, supra note 203, at 111 (interpreting a 1744 sermon by Elisha Williams and based
on John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, in which Williams argued that freedom
in choices depends on the development of reasoning capabilities); HINCHLIFFE, supra note
158, at 67 (relying on John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty to argue that “liberty requires both the
exercise of choice and free deliberation so that an individual is able to think and act with independence of thought and action”); see also ADRIAN O’CONNOR, IN PURSUIT OF POLITICS:
EDUCATION AND REVOLUTION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 115 (2017) (“Emphasizing
the role of people’s ‘independence’ and ‘competence’ in determining their collective capacity to
make good decisions, [de Condorcet] seemed primarily concerned with giving people knowledge
and skills, less with the cultivation of civic sentiment or political virtues.” (emphases added)).
290
See NICOLAS DE CONDORCET, The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction (1791),
in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 105, 108 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976) (“The son
of a rich man will not belong to the same class as the son of a poor man unless there is a system
of public instruction to close the gap between them.”); DE GROUCHY, LETTERS ON SYMPATHY,
supra note 258, at 68–70, 98, 136–37, 147–48; POCOCK, supra note 138, at 208.
291
WALKER, supra note 205, at 31.
292
Id. at 31–32; see Rogers, David Walker, supra note 157, at 74–75 (noting that the bootblack “confuses the fact that he cleans shoes because he has no choice with the idea that he
cleans shoes because he has freely chosen that profession”); cf. GOUREVITCH, supra note 156,
at 157 (citation omitted) (noting Ira Steward’s belief that inadequate mainstream education
meant that workers “‘will be found, every election day, in company with master Capitalists,
voting down schemes for their own emancipation!’”).
293
See BREWER, supra note 203, at 126; see also BLACK, SCHOOLHOUSE BURNING, supra
note 19, at 100–01 (recounting arguments by Reconstruction senators like Charles Sumner
and Oliver Morton for the indispensability of universal education in a republic); MICHAEL
A. REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY: SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION 2 (2018)
[hereinafter REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY] (“For America’s founders, [like Benjamin Rush
and Thomas Jefferson,] preparing young people to be capable citizens was the primary reason
to establish a public school system.”); WOOD, supra note 139, at 397 (describing Benjamin
Rush’s insistence on instituting a robust public education system lest the United States cease to
be self-governing for long); Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate
Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 113 (2013) (“[M]any of the intellectual and political
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public opinion,” George Washington argued (prefiguring Mann), “it is essential that
public opinion should be enlightened[.]”294 The right to vote, often considered our
most fundamental, has thus figured prominently into justifications for robust public
education.295 In one sense, education is technically necessary to exercise our right
to vote, but in another, education actually “enhance[s] . . . the value of that right.”296
In The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction, de Condorcet wrote:
Public instruction is an obligation of society toward its citizens.
It would be vain to declare that all men enjoy equal rights, vain
for the laws to respect the first principle of eternal justice, if the
inequality in men’s mental faculties were to prevent the greatest
number from enjoying these rights to their fullest extent.297
It could not be that liberty and equality are only “words [that the people] hear read in
their codes and not rights [that] they know how to enjoy.”298 We must first understand
our rights in order to love them and to feel empowered to enforce them.299 Public
education provides the requisite skills and common understandings with which we can
do so, enabling us to author, edit, and contest law as politically mature citizens.300
heavyweights of the Framing era championed education not just as an instrument for righteous
living, but as a building block of democratic society. For Noah Webster, Thomas Jefferson,
Benjamin Rush, and John Adams, government had a duty to make education widely available
to safeguard the democratic order.”).
294
GEORGE WASHINGTON, Farewell Address, September 19, 1796, in GEORGE WASHINGTON:
SELECTED WRITINGS 364, 374 (Ron Chernow ed., 2011).
295
E.g., HORACE MANN, Means and Objects of Common-School Education, in 2 LIFE AND
WORKS OF HORACE MANN, supra note 249, at 39, 83 (“The theory of our government is,—
not that all men, however unfit, shall be voters,—but that every man, by the power of reason
and the sense of duty, shall become fit to be a voter.”).
296
JAMES WILSON, Of the Legislative Department, in 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra
note 109, at 403.
297
DE CONDORCET, supra note 290, at 105; see O’CONNOR, supra note 289, at 118 (discussing how de Condorcet “thought education necessary for the establishment of ‘equality’
because it offered the means by which to abolish relationships of ‘dependence’ between
individuals”).
298
See DE CONDORCET, supra note 290, at 107 (emphasis added).
299
See id. at 105–07; accord George Washington, First Annual Address to Congress,
WASHINGTON LIBRARY, https://www.mountvernon.org/education/primary-sources/state-of
-the-union-address [https://perma.cc/XBS8-DC6K] (arguing that education protects the people’s
“enlightened confidence,” enabling them to discern when they are being oppressed and when
they are not).
300
See PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 217–18 (identifying the people’s
“authorial” and “editorial” roles under republicanism); cf. O’CONNOR, supra note 289, at 81
(noting the new, fundamental challenge for revolutionary France to develop educational institutions that could “maintain[] social cohesion amid interpersonal competition and contestation”).
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Lastly, republican education demands that all students be able to acquire and
refine skills and learning that in fact enable them to reach their full potential,
regardless of where they began.301 Antidomination rejects consigning students to
educational tracks, whether vocational or liberal arts, absent their avowed, informed
interest in a given path.302 Antidomination prioritizes social mobility and dissolves
entrenched hierarchies and exploitable relationships.303
The price that democratic societies will have to pay for their continuing health is the elimination of an oligarchy . . . that attempts
to monopolize the benefits of intelligence and of the best methods for the profit of a few privileged ones, while practical labor,
requiring less spiritual effort and less initiative, remains the lot
of the great majority.304
Even in a society that at any given time has elites, meaning citizens closer to social
and political centers of power, students becoming elites must be trained against
dominating others and, more importantly, trained to protect and promote institutions
that eliminate domination where it exists.305
301

See, e.g., DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 226 (“Democracy
cannot flourish where the chief influences in selecting subject matter of instruction are utilitarian
ends narrowly conceived for the masses, and, for the higher education of the few, the traditions
of a specialized cultivated class. The notion that the ‘essentials’ of elementary education are
the three R’s mechanically treated, is based upon ignorance of the essentials needed for realization of democratic ideals.”); K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA & TERESA L. MCCARTY, “TO REMAIN
AN INDIAN”: LESSONS IN DEMOCRACY FROM A CENTURY OF NATIVE AMERICAN EDUCATION
169–70 (2006) (“Danger lies not in diversity, but in attempts to standardize and homogenize the
linguistically and culturally diverse peoples who comprise the nation’s citizenry. Disguised as
an equalizing force, standardization in fact stratifies, segregates, and undercuts human potential,
denying equality of opportunity for all. We have only to consider the history of Native American
education to see the standardizing juggernaut in its true form.”).
302
See, e.g., Viona J. Miller, Access Denied: Tracking as a Modern Roadblock to Equal
Educational Opportunity, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903, 906–07, 938–40 (2018) (arguing that educational tracking “is inequitable since it disadvantages all students in lower tracks by denying
them access to the educational opportunities necessary to succeed”).
303
See HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 153 (quoting ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS
FROM PRISON NOTEBOOKS 41 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith trans., 1971))
(“[T]he move away from a common school to a variety of provision with a more vocational
orientation would lead back ‘to a division into juridicially fixed and crystallised estates rather
than moving towards the transcendence of class divisions.’”).
304
JOHN DEWEY, Education from a Social Perspective, in 7 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE
WORKS, 1899–1924, at 113, 127 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1979); see generally Fishkin &
Forbath, supra note 159.
305
See JAMES WILSON, Of the Study of Law in the United States, in 1 WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON, supra note 109, at 23 (“Of no class of citizens can the education be of more publick
consequence, than that of those, who are destined to take an active part in publick affairs.”);
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3. Educating for More Than Civic Virtue
When we think about education in the republican project, we often turn to “civic
education” and nurturing “virtuous citizens.”306 Although the need for schools to
provide more practice in democratic participation is real,307 republican education
need not—and should not—be mere civics or values inculcation as traditionally
understood.308 Education-as-antidomination might generate “virtuous citizens,” but
that is not its primary purpose.309 As suggested above, nondomination is a useful,
protective principle in part because it presumes that we are not virtuous and will not
necessarily be virtuous.310
Education is “preparation for living in the space of reasons.”311 Because “those
[dominated] do not ask for reasons and those [dominating] do not feel obliged to
give them,” the asking and giving of reasons “exemplifies, in practice, how people
recognise each other as free beings.”312 But although republicanism entails citizens
seeing each other as political equals, it does not demand either loyalty to a particular
see also DRIVER, SCHOOLHOUSE GATE, supra note 134, at 22 (“[I]t is impossible to disregard
the constitutional rights of students without ultimately damaging the republic to which students
pledge allegiance.”); Anderson, Fair Opportunity, supra note 213, at 596 (arguing that, given
the inevitable rise of elites, elites must possess the skills to serve others effectively and the
interest to do so in the first place); Smith, supra note 277, at 248 (citation omitted) (“[I]t is only
by ensuring that the testimonies of the least advantaged are given adequate attention in our
deliberations that we can hope to progress toward fulfilling our liberal democratic ideals.”).
306
E.g., DALY & HICKEY, supra note 154, at 169–96; LABAREE, supra note 246, at 13–15,
18–19, 40–41, 49–52; TAYLOR, HORACE MANN’S TROUBLING LEGACY, supra note 247, at
1–7, 13–16; Friedman & Solow, supra note 293, at 121–27 (recounting the common schools
movement’s multiple goals, among them shaping citizens’ values and identities); Sherry, supra
note 146, at 156–82; Joshua E. Weishart, Democratizing Education Rights, 29 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1, 47–52 (2020) [hereinafter Weishart, Democratizing Education Rights].
307
See, e.g., MEIRA LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN LEFT BEHIND 32–50 (2012); REBELL, FLUNKING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 293, at 17–23.
308
See Costa, supra note 211, at 159–62 (arguing that while some skills-based civics
education is important, much broader learning is needed).
309
Indeed, some scholars have defined civic virtue in terms of capability to resist domination. E.g., DALY & HICKEY, supra note 154, at 169 (“Realising the ideal of freedom as nondomination will require not only well-designed institutions and laws, but also virtuous citizens,
sensitive and resistive to arbitrary power.”); VERGARA, supra note 155, at 130–31 (explaining
Machiavelli’s view that nondomination does not entail “active engagement in politics [as]
an end in itself” and that civic participation “is functional, a necessary means for maintaining
a republican structure conducive to liberty”); Bergès, supra note 189, at 107 (explaining de
Grouchy’s view that “civic education begins at the cradle, and is not merely a question of
imparting values but of developing the right kind of psychological habits”).
310
See supra notes 212–19 and accompanying text.
311
HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 45.
312
Id.; cf. McCammon, supra note 196, at 1046–47 (describing dominators’ “deliberative
isolation,” the degree to which they are “accountable to [others] when it comes to how they
use their power”).
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moral creed or lessons in “civic virtue.”313 “Democratic society is peculiarly dependent,” Dewey wrote, “for its maintenance upon the use in forming a course of study
of criteria which are broadly human.”314 Democracy cannot flourish where public
instruction serves merely “utilitarian ends narrowly conceived for the masses, and,
for the higher education of the few, the traditions of a specialized cultivated class.”315
“An important aim of [republican] education, then, is to liberate children from the
perils of epistemic dependency or to ensure as far as possible that children can avoid
this when they are adults.”316
One further caution, however, against fixating on civics or civic virtue: we should
be wary of schools as purely preparatory. We accept that “education should facilitate
access to what might be called the three C’s: college, careers[,] and citizenship.”317
But focusing too much on preparing children to be adults “neglects the important
possibility” that childhood, “the stage of life before we become capable of rational
planning,” offers “opportunities for flourishing [valuable] in their own right.”318 Indeed,
we recognize that children are different and have different needs than adults,319 and
that when schooling includes play, “going to school is a joy, management is less of
a burden, and learning is easier.”320 To the extent, moreover, that schools must
model democracy—“more than a form of government[,] . . . primarily a mode of
associated living”—that will inevitably entail enjoyment as much as practice.321
4. At the Convergence of Equity and Adequacy
We can gain a better sense of what nondomination demands—and what educationas-antidomination looks like—by considering the long-standing debate between
313

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (overruling Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)) (“[Boards of Education] have, of course, important,
delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits
of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”); see DRIVER, SCHOOLHOUSE GATE, supra note 134, at 62–71 (discussing the history
and impact of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette).
314
DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 225–26 (emphasis added).
315
Id. at 226.
316
HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 90.
317
Macleod, supra note 19, at 82.
318
Id. at 78.
319
See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860, 1879 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Interpreting Rights].
320
DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 228. That said, play and
work are “not matters of temporary expediency and momentary agreeableness” but are
themselves “intellectual and social.” Id. at 229; accord DE GROUCHY, LETTERS ON SYMPATHY,
supra note 258, at 116–17 (criticizing teaching methods that strip out enjoyment, fun, and
aesthetic meaning).
321
See DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 101.
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educational equity and educational adequacy. Lawyers and scholars generally
recount the history of school finance litigation in “waves.”322 In the first wave
(1971–73), advocates relied on the United States Constitution to argue “that equal
protection guaranteed a right to substantially equal funding among school districts.”323
In the second wave (1973–89), advocates relied on state constitutions to achieve
equity either through roughly equalizing per-pupil funding or through minimizing
school funding reliance on district property wealth.324 In the third wave (1989
onward), advocates continued to rely on state constitutions but instead to argue for
baselines of educational adequacy.325
Alongside this progression, scholars and advocates have debated whether educational equity or educational adequacy is the worthier goal. Whereas adequacy
“aims to combat absolute deprivation” of educational resources or opportunities,
equity “aims to combat [their] relative deprivation.”326 Equity entails some kind of
equalization, whether of school resources or of opportunities more broadly,327 and
equity proponents generally argue that it demands more of us than adequacy does.328
In contrast, adequacy (or sufficiency) “can be understood as an expression of two
theses, one positive and one negative.”329 Whereas the positive “‘stresses the importance of people living above a certain threshold, free from deprivation,’” the
negative “‘denies the relevance of certain additional distributive requirements.’”330
In recent years, advocates on each side of the equity-adequacy debate have
conceded the value of the other ideal, and the sides have steadily converged.331 Still
322

See, e.g., David G. Hinojosa, “Race-Conscious” School Finance Litigation: Is a Fourth
Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869, 871–73 (2016); Koski, supra note 129, at 1188–94;
William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat From Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 556–62 (2006).
323
Koski & Reich, supra note 322, at 557.
324
Id. at 557–59.
325
Id. at 559–62.
326
See Rob Reich, Equality, Adequacy, and K–12 Education [hereinafter Reich, Equality,
Adequacy, and K–12 Education], in EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 19,
at 43, 48.
327
See Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV.
477, 486 (2014) [hereinafter Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy] (offering
“a general account that features three views traditionally associated with the principle—
nondiscrimination, meritocracy, and equal life chances”).
328
See, e.g., Reich, Equality, Adequacy, and K–12 Education, supra note 326, at 51–52.
329
Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, supra note 327, at 512.
330
Id. (quoting Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296, 297–98
(2007)).
331
Compare Reich, Equality, Adequacy, and K–12 Education, supra note 326, at 55 (“Defining the equal standing of citizens in a robust manner, such that opportunities to participate
in civic life are roughly equal, will bring the adequacy orientation much closer to the equality
orientation in practice.”), with Anderson, Fair Opportunity, supra note 213, at 618 (“[T]he
proper egalitarian aim is to ensure, to the extent feasible, that everyone has sufficient human
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others have observed how the two ideals are inextricable. Joshua Weishart has argued,
for example, that equity and adequacy “are not mutually exclusive” but rather “mutually reinforcing.”332 They are relative to one another and dynamic, accommodating
each other where a claim for one might be stronger than a claim for the other.333
Kristine Bowman has argued similarly that “liberty and equality claims form a double
helix in education reform litigation.”334 Liberty and equality claims are necessarily
“entwined” in any lawsuit seeking to remedy education inequities or inadequacies.335
The debate’s convergence is appropriate, timely, and reflects Dewey’s own rejection
of dualism.336
As it turns out, the convergence of equity and adequacy reveals aspects of what
nondomination demands, and education as antidomination should assuage equity
and adequacy partisans.337 Critics of equity point out that, in equalizing opportunities,
there is always risk of “leveling down” what resources we provide to students.338
Antidomination is a commitment not to do so. Because the republican project is one
of liberation and because to level down is to induce scarcity and to invite domination,
nondomination demands high levels of educational opportunity.339 Given changing
needs, especially during crisis, nondomination requires that resources spent on
education increase, presumably until returns are so marginal as to disappear.340
capital to function as an equal in civil society—to avoid oppression by others, to enjoy standing
as an equal, to participate in productive life, and so forth. This sometimes requires more intensive
investment in the disadvantaged than an equality of resources standard would allow.”).
332
Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, supra note 327, at 480.
333
See id. at 525–42; see also Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 215, 224 (2017) [hereinafter Weishart, Equal Liberty]; Joshua E. Weishart,
Protecting a Federal Right to Educational Equality and Adequacy [hereinafter Weishart,
Protecting a Federal Right], in FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION, supra note 17, at 303, 365
(describing “the dual nature of the right to education as both a positive claim to an adequate
education (compelling state action) and negative immunity against inequitable distributions
of educational opportunity (blocking state action)”).
334
Bowman, supra note 19, at 16.
335
Id. at 45–52.
336
See, e.g., DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 105, at 141–44 (rejecting
dualism between developing the mind and developing the body through education); id. at
228–30, 277–90 (rejecting dualism between “naturalism and humanism in education”).
337
There is an important conceptual difference here: equity and adequacy refer to resources and opportunities provided to students, whereas nondomination refers to students’
experience as “liberty-bearing” agents. See HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 74.
338
See Anderson, Fair Opportunity, supra note 213, at 615; Weishart, Equal Liberty,
supra note 333, at 226–29 (discussing the flaws of formal equality in the context of first- and
second-wave school finance equalization).
339
Equalization runs the risk also of leaving stigmatic or “[i]ntangible harms” in place
even while progress appears to be made. Moran, Let Freedom Ring, supra note 250, at 484.
This was the lesson of Brown v. Board of Education: that separate is “inherently unequal.”
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
340
See Moran, Let Freedom Ring, supra note 250, at 484.
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Critics of adequacy, meanwhile, point out that mere resource baselines do not
constrain what families might spend privately on their own children’s education. In
failing to do so, baselines lead to inequities, which then ripple out into society and
reinforce themselves, entrenching power and privilege.341 Even worse, merely ensuring a baseline while permitting private spending above it effectively conscripts the
government into perpetuating these inequities, thus contravening the equal standing
of citizens.342 Antidomination, however, is a commitment to eliminate inequities that
result in domination. Although antidomination does not necessarily equalize—
nondomination does not mean the absence of difference—it does require constant
attention to potentially harmful effects of disparities and disparate practices.343
Thus, an antidomination approach would meet both equity and adequacy needs.
And whereas the eventual goal of republican education is liberation, it can be more
useful to think of its immediate role as “the development of those human powers
that enable agents to exercise their freedoms and to resist potential and actual
invasions of liberty.”344 Because education is necessary and uniquely disposed to
mend domination’s costs and to equip us to resist further domination, it forms an
essential part of our constitutional commitment to republicanism.
B. The Republican Guarantee as an Ongoing Obligation
As a guarantee of nondomination and thus of a fundamental right to education,
the republican guarantee presents a deep conceptual challenge: the antidomination
duty that the guarantee imposes on the federal legislative, executive, and judicial
branches is an ongoing one. Some violations of, or failures to fulfill, the obligation
will likely persist even after others have been redressed. With respect to education,
moreover, fulfilling the obligation will likely require complex solutions developed
by all three branches, and likely other actors too.
By “ongoing,” therefore, I mean persistent and complex, but not necessarily indeterminate.345 When it comes to persistence, we should understand the antidomination
duty as a duty to minimize domination, that is to eradicate it as best as we can.346
341

See Reich, Equality, Adequacy, and K–12 Education, supra note 326, at 60.
Id. at 57; accord Koski & Reich, supra note 322, at 595, 606.
343
See, e.g., Anderson, Fair Opportunity, supra note 213, at 615 (citation omitted); PETTIT,
JUST FREEDOM, supra note 153, at xxvi (offering an “eyeball test” for nondomination, under
which individuals “can look others in the eye without reason for fear or deference of the kind
that a power of interference might inspire”).
344
HINCHLIFFE, supra note 158, at 64.
345
I have seen no evidence suggesting that the requirements of nondomination are unknowable, even if they are not yet entirely known.
346
See LEMIEUX & WATKINS, supra note 120, at 106; LOVETT, DOMINATION AND JUSTICE,
supra note 153, at 159–65.
342
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Because society is not static, however, we likely cannot minimize domination through
one set of statutes, regulations, and rulings.347 “New forms of domination will
inevitably arise from changing patterns in human social relations, even when the old
forms have been successfully addressed with law.”348 In other words, even after a
legislature enacts a law, an executive administers it, or a court remedies its violation,
the demands of nondomination almost certainly have yet to be met and violations
of the republican guarantee persist. This is especially true for institutions with everchanging needs, like schools, a fact that has not gone unnoticed.349 That said, believing
that there is “a destination, an attainable, fixed point of constitutional compliance,
merely dooms courts and legislatures to failure in [education] cases.”350 This belief is
especially misguided when adjudicating such values as equity and adequacy, which
are “comparative, dynamic, and interminable constitutional ends.”351
When it comes to complexity, “social problems that have multiple causes require
far-reaching, complex, and cumbersome institutional reform and choices among
controversial alternative policies.”352 In other words, it will not be easy to resolve
claims of domination in one area (e.g., education) when domination in other areas
(e.g., employment, housing, and health) contribute substantially or exacerbate the
problem. In the educational context, it might be impossible for our governments “to
neutralize all of the differential effects of social circumstances (e.g., race, class, and
gender) and natural endowments (innate talents and (dis)abilities) on every child’s
chances for educational achievement.”353 To do so might be to create “a tapline into
the state treasury that could drain it of every last dollar.”354 Moreover, judicial
review itself has limits. Without coordinated (or contested) efforts among branches
347
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348
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of government, state as well as federal, courts likely cannot eliminate domination
in education,355 much less everywhere that it exists.356
Consider, as an illustration of this problem, the Land Ordinance of 1785 and the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which “reserved sections of public lands for the
support of common schools” and prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory, then
occupied by the Potawatomi, Shawnee, and other Native nations and comprising the
present states around the Great Lakes.357 On the one hand, the ordinances “laid the
groundwork” for the development of our public education system.358 On the other
hand, they “envisioned a process for newly acquired lands that eventually became
the basic principle of all territorial acquisition and governance,” extending settler
colonialism at the United States’ borders.359 Although the ordinances increased
federal (and state) priority on education and established a model for local education,
their legacy included the displacement and domination of Native peoples, thus
necessitating further antidomination efforts.
Or consider, as another illustration, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, also
known as the Interstate Highway Act.360 The Act allocated billions of dollars for
constructing much of our current interstate system, “fundamentally restructur[ing]
urban America.”361 As the expansion of highways opened up regional and crosscountry travel to those with a car, “the ability to drive on the interstate highways
offered Black people a certain amount of freedom from the oppression they experienced
on public transportation” and more broadly across the Jim Crow South.362 At the same
time, however, highways split up or encircled communities, overwhelmingly Black
and low-income communities in particular, often purposefully disrupting, hollowing
out, and segregating them.363 As with settler colonialism, the lasting effects of these
decisions necessitate further redress.
355
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The gravity of the challenge underlying an ongoing obligation explains our resistance to adjudicating—and to legislating—the republican guarantee, especially as a
source for education rights. The political question doctrine is superficial in comparison, concealing this deeper but unarticulated unease. To begin—only to begin—to
address this challenge, I raise three responses. First, concerns about the persistence
or complexity of domination cannot overcome the necessity, even inevitability, of
an antidomination ratchet. Better to get to work on the problem than to bemoan its
difficulty. Second, with respect to courts, the creativity in common law adjudication
is actually a uniquely powerful problem-solving tool. As long as courts are candid in
trying, failing, and refining standards, the organic, case-by-case approach of American
courts affords flexibility in minimizing domination. Third, interbranch coordination
and contestation are key, and we can address judicial capacity concerns by expanding the Article III bench, Article II adjudication capabilities (to support Article III
courts), and even Article I oversight and hearings.
1. The Necessity of Minimizing Domination
Regardless of how challenging this ongoing obligation seems to be, it is ultimately necessary. In one sense of “necessary,” I mean that meeting this challenge is
worthy. If we do not commit to replacing domination with liberation, “then we will
have set up nothing but a beeswax simulacrum of a free nation.”364 Despite the often
taken-for-granted work that educators put in, for example, public schools remain
inadequate and inequitable, and we remain susceptible to social fracture and extremism.365 “The present state of the world is more than a reminder that we have now to
put forth every energy of our own to prove worthy of our heritage.”366
In another sense of “necessary,” I mean that the challenge is unavoidable. Consider, for example, the concern mentioned above that merely ensuring a baseline of
educational adequacy makes government complicit in perpetuating inequities that
arise from private dollars spent above that baseline.367 One realist response is that
government “is already complicit in inequality of educational opportunities.”368 Despite
refusing to recognize a fundamental right to education, “the judiciary has continued
364
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to shape educational policy simply by reviewing the practices of school districts and
states.”369 Indeed, government is complicit in protecting institutions that perpetuate
racial, gender, and other hierarchies on the basis of status differentials, whether it
had a hand in creating them or not.370 “[J]udicial violence,” which includes inaction just
the same as action, “may reinforce patterns of domination and exclusion otherwise
persisting in society.”371 Given the ubiquity of domination in our world, “no matter
what mechanisms of contestation exist, individuals will not be very likely to contest
laws and policies successfully unless others [like legal institutions] are properly
responsive to their arguments and perspectives.”372
Because the challenge of antidomination is worthy and unavoidable, what
matters will not be whether we articulate and then resolve it but how. As Charles
Black wrote: “There is a myth that lawyers must think small, even meanly, or lose
the aura of professionalism. As in all other matters, we should think at the level of
magnitude proportioned to the problem.”373
As with lawyering, a key component for republican judging is candor. Courts
“need not pretend that the law is always determinate or that some issues are not genuinely political.”374 Judicial decisions, especially those that introduce domination, will
always be contestable.375 But we are not new to hard cases, there will always be hard
cases, and governance (collective or otherwise) is often discretionary.
369
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2. Legal Creativity in Minimizing Domination
Antidomination is not only a necessary endeavor, to the extent that we want to
become a republic, but also one amenable to creative approaches already available.
Courts, for example, regularly engage in common law adjudication, notwithstanding
the steady rise of statutory law. Claim-by-claim lawmaking can be “the perfect
vehicle for deriving content” from broad constitutional provisions.376 As Yasmin
Dawood has argued, moreover, antidomination favors a harm minimization approach
that “takes into account the institutional capacities [or competencies] of courts.”377
In the elections context, “instances of domination” include “malfunctions, stoppages,
self-entrenching tactics, [and] majorities disadvantaging minorities,” which are
discrete matters that are easy for judicial consideration.378 We can readily analogize
to other areas of law.379
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez exemplifies obstruction of, rather than openness to, common
law adjudication.380 In that case, the Court overturned a district court’s decision that
a Texas school finance system based on local property taxes violated equal protection.381 The Court denied that the district court opinion “reflect[ed] the [issue’s]
novelty and complexity” but acknowledged that the court “relied on decisions dealing
with the rights of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and appellate
processes, and on cases disapproving wealth restrictions on the right to vote.”382
Rather than accept the district court’s creative, analogic reasoning, the Court took
a less common law–friendly approach, declaring that the case “in significant aspects
is sui generis” and could not be considered within the “mosaic of constitutional [equal
protection analysis].”383
Rights thinking offers solutions too, especially where broad constitutional provisions can give way to reframed rights. The Gary B. complaint’s focus on a right
to literacy exemplifies this.384 Scholars have disagreed about how well this seemingly
minimal right encapsulates the importance of education.385 However, focusing on
376
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literacy “as a specific manifestation of a right to education” could, and for a time appeared to, overcome concerns of novelty, partisanship, inefficacy, and unmanageability.386 By reframing the right, advocates gained an audience and left some elaboration
for later.
At the same time, rights thinking can obscure the subtleties of needs, dependence, and power, “crowding out alternative ways of thinking and new solutions.”387
Alternatives even to rights thinking can be needed. Consider Plyler v. Doe, in which
the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute withholding state funds from school
districts educating undocumented children violated the Fourteenth Amendment.388
Ostensibly, the Court’s decision was based on protecting the children’s rights. But
what “right” did the statute violate? The Court seemed to agree with its prior
decisions that “public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.”389 If not a right to education, then perhaps a right of undocumented persons
“to the equal protection of Texas law”?390 But the Court equivocated on this point
as well.391 “[M]ore is involved,” the Court reasoned, “than the abstract question whether
[the Texas statute] discriminate[d] against a suspect class, or whether education is
a fundamental right.”392
The “more” involved was domination. The statute “impose[d] a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children,” the “stigma of illiteracy [would] mark them for
the rest of their lives,” and denying them education would “deny them the ability to
live” as equals.393 More broadly, the statute would create and perpetuate a “subclass”
of illiterate individuals, perhaps a “permanent caste” of undocumented persons,
“encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless
denied the benefits that our society makes available” to others.394 Although the Court
in Plyler did not use the language of freedom as nondomination, its attention to the
harms of domination bespeaks concern for a problem that “rights” might not have
Gary B. lawsuit as an antisubordination lawsuit), with Imoukhuede, Fifth Freedom, supra note
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encapsulated.395 A justiciable, nondomination-centered republican guarantee would
have been an apt device with which to strike down Texas’s statute.
3. Collaborating On and Contesting Antidomination Approaches
It almost goes without saying that antidomination, not least through education,
will require the actions of more than just courts. To be sure, courts can be very
effective in minimizing domination in certain circumstances.396 But “we do not need
judicial review to serve as a ‘silver bullet’ solution to the problem of domination,”
especially when other institutions apply themselves to antidomination.397 Indeed, it
is because other institutions sometimes lack incentives to pursue nondomination that
we have conventionally expected courts to intercede,398 especially on behalf of “discrete and insular minorities.”399 Hence courts’ ubiquitous involvement in “drawing
school district lines, administering prisons, supervising railroads, prescribing personnel
procedures for police departments, [etc.]”400 Because it seems “quicker and cheaper”
to assign tasks to an existing government body than to create a new one, “courts will
pick up many lawmaking and administrative tasks simply because they are there.”401
There is no shortage, however, of solutions for the accretion of judicial power
or for courts being stretched too thin. Courts themselves can compel other branches,
as best as they can, to act.402 In McCleary v. State, for example, the Supreme Court
of Washington issued a contempt order against the state legislature for failing to
make sufficient progress on fully funding state education.403 The court acknowledged
its long-standing cooperation with the legislature to vindicate education rights.404 But
395
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the court also clarified its twofold role: “first, the court draws a baseline to ensure
that the legislature has ‘done enough’ to fulfill its constitutional duty; and second,
once the legislature has defined the specifics of its duty through education policies,
the court enforces the legislature’s self-drawn standards.”405
Courts can also permit state and local governments to undertake bona fide antidomination efforts. This might seem like a banal point, but the Supreme Court has
failed to do this in the past. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, a fractured Court held that two school districts’ race-conscious
desegregation plans were unconstitutional.406 Curiously, the Court majority that
struck down the plans conceded that “racially identifiable housing patterns” have
lasting effects on school assignments, effects that might justify taking action, but
then also contended that the school districts in question could not point to the effects
of racially identifiable school assignment patterns to justify voluntary desegregation.407 “[A] majority of the Justices were so concerned with limiting remedies for
past discrimination that they largely overlooked the problem of constraining a
community’s capacity to imagine its racial future.”408 Indeed, the Court’s distaste for
race-conscious remedies, like voluntary desegregation and affirmative action, is a
problem of its own making. The Court could “examine and remedy the root causes”
of the need for such policies, for example opportunity gaps and other systemic
failures, or it could let institutions willing to do this work do so.409 But to bar both
options is only to invite domination.
To the extent that the federal courts continue to keep education in particular at
arm’s length, Congress and the federal executive could expand the authority of
federal education administration, even devise and delegate power to a more substantial
administrative judiciary. Congress could staff such a division with judges experienced in education policy and pedagogy and better able to handle an increased or
specialized caseload; it could convene education researchers and practitioners; it could
study and more aggressively fill funding, best practice, or other gaps between schools
nationwide. Given the scope of the challenge, none of this need be off the table.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have made both descriptive and normative claims. As a descriptive matter, I have tried to illuminate the real reason that we have so far declined to
405
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interpret the United States Constitution’s republican guarantee as protecting a
fundamental right to education, and that we have only rarely relied on the guarantee
for other matters. It is not that the guarantee is unfit for judicial consideration, though
that has been the conventional view. The real reason is instead that the guarantee is
more consequential, if more focused, than we have led ourselves to believe, and it
seems at first glance to require more of us than we have so far been prepared to give,
especially with respect to education.
As a normative matter, I have tried to explain what I think the best interpretation
of the republican guarantee is: an antidomination duty on the federal government.
Understanding the guarantee to demand nondomination of course raises challenging
conceptual and implementation questions, but I believe that they are well worth the
effort. In the educational context, an antidomination approach goes beyond traditional interests in creating virtuous citizens and instead focuses attention and resources on training students to distinguish dependence from domination, helping
them to see each other as equals, and providing them with knowledge and know-how
to resist the atomizing effects of domination. An effective pursuit of nondomination
“does not require heroes so much as it requires tools for resistance to and insulation
from domination.”410 Thus, although the republican guarantee as a nondomination
guarantee entails an ongoing project, I have tried to show that with candor and
ingenuity, we (and our institutions) should be able to rise to this challenge.

410

Watkins, supra note 151, at 534.

